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INTRODUCTION
Correctly understood, the effects of labor and pensions are not only
central to the corporate governance debate; as the United States, United
Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Switzerland show, pension systems
largely make up capital markets.1 Other continental European countries,
such as Germany and Austria, illustrate that a lack of significant pension
assets corresponds with a lack of deep capital markets. While pension
assets in the United States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and the
Netherlands exceed their gross domestic product (“GDP”), occupational
pension assets account for less than a quarter of GDP in Germany and
Austria.2 Germany and Austria provide for quasi-parity or third-parity
1. Markus Roth, Private Altersvorsorge als Aspekt der Corporate Governance,
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [ZGR] 516, 527 (2011)
(Ger.) [hereinafter Roth, Private Altersvorsorge 2011].
2. See TOWERS WATSON, GLOBAL PENSION ASSETS STUDY 7 (2013), available at
http://www.towerswatson.com/en/Insights/IC-Types/Survey-Research-Results/2013/01/
Global-Pensions-Asset-Study-2013 (finding the following ratios of pension assets to
GDP: Netherlands 156%, Switzerland 118%, United Kingdom 112%, United States
108%, Germany 15%). The ratio of private pension assets, including individual
(private or personal) pension assets, is higher than the ratio of occupational pensions to
GDP. See OECD PRIVATE PENSIONS OUTLOOK 44 fig.1.2, 61 fig.2.5 (2008):
Netherlands 149.1 versus 132.2%, Switzerland 151.9 versus 119.4%, United Kingdom
96.4 versus 86.1%, United States 124.0 versus 74.3%, Austria 18.8 versus 4.7%,
Germany 17.9 versus 4.1% (data for 2007); for more recent data for occupational
pensions, see OECD, PENSIONS AT A GLANCE 2011 173 (2011), available at
http://www.oecd—ilibrary.org/docserver/download/8111011e.pdf?
expires=1359327528&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=A3F306006CF6843EB837A
73326C37B31 (a higher ratio of pension assets to GDP exists when individual
(personal) pensions are included).
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board-level co-determination of employees,3 which is unknown to the
United Kingdom, the United States, and Switzerland, and not mandatory
for international holding companies in the Netherlands.4 Although the
Netherlands does provide for third-parity co-determination for national
companies, international holding companies like EADS, the parent
company of Airbus, are co-determination free.
Reflecting the great importance of occupational pensions and
public pension funds in the United States, Peter Drucker popularized the
phrase “pension-fund socialism” shortly after the introduction of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) in the 1970s.5
This concept captures the overwhelming importance of the pension fund
industry in the U.S., and of employees as ultimate beneficiaries.6 In the
United Kingdom, the term “pension-fund capitalism” was coined at the
height of the stock market around the new millennium.7 Until then,
countries that lacked, or had only a minor presence of, occupational
pensions tended to have a blockholder corporate governance system,
while dispersed ownership was the common form in countries focused
on occupational pensions.8 The ownership structure has evolved, at
3. See Klaus J. Hopt, Labor Codetermination in Europe, 6 J. COMP. BUS. &
CAPITAL MARKET L. 203, 216–22 (1984).
4. Markus Roth, Employee Participation, Corporate Governance and the Firm: A
Transatlantic View Focused on Occupational Pensions and Co-Determination, 11 EUR.
BUS. ORGANIZATIONAL L. REV. 51, 70–72 (2010) [hereinafter Roth, Employee
Participation].
5. See PETER F. DRUCKER, THE UNSEEN REVOLUTION: HOW PENSION FUND
SOCIALISM CAME TO AMERICA 68 (1976); see also William H. Simon, The Prospects of
Pension Fund Socialism, 14 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 251 (1993) (noting that
Drucker popularized the term).
6. See DRUCKER, supra note 5 at 1 (Through their pension funds, employees of
American business today own at least 25% of its equity capital; pension funds of the
self-employed, of the public employees, and of school and college teachers own at least
another 10%.).
7. GORDON L. CLARK, PENSION FUND CAPITALISM (2000). Focusing on defined
benefit schemes, DAVID BLAKE, PENSION SCHEMES AND PENSION FUNDS IN THE UNITED
KINGDOM 575 (2d ed. 2003), stated that in 2000, through their pension funds,
companies in Britain owned about one-third of one another. For a comprehensive
analysis of the evolution of the British Corporate Govenance System from a company
law perspective, see BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL:
BRITISH BUSINESS TRANSFORMED (2008).
8. For an early comparison of the United States and Germany, see Richard M.
Buxbaum, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A Comparative Perspective,
57 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1991), and Friedrich K. Kübler, Institutional Owners and
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least in Germany, leaving many blue chips in dispersed ownership and
most with a majority of foreign shareholders.9 In a separate worldwide
trend, occupational pension schemes changed from defined benefits
(“DB”) to defined contributions (“DC”), thereby shifting the investment
risk from the employers to employees, and investment from pension
funds to investment companies.10 Therefore, the term “pension
capitalism” is more accurate and will be used in this contribution on
comparative corporate governance from the transatlantic perspective.
Different levels of reliance on occupational pensions correlate with
total market capitalization of the respective countries and, inter alia,
different funding levels of financial supervisory agencies.11 This
correlation is more significant than the civil law/common law country
explanation.12 The importance of private pension assets may better
explain such differences than investor protection as measured by La
Porta et al.13 This approach has been criticized for failing to consider all
The shareholder
relevant mechanisms of investor protection.14

Corporate Managers: A German Dilemma, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 97 (1991). Since the
United States and United Kingdom pension funds shifted their investment strategy
towards foreign equity, institutional investors are now the most important class of
investors in countries with a minor presence of private pensions.
9. See infra Part I.C.3.
10. At the end of 2011, a majority of pension assets were in the form of DC plans
in the United States, Australia and Switzerland, (57%, 81% and 60%, respectively). See
TOWERS WATSON, GLOBAL PENSION ASSETS STUDY 36–37 (2012), available at
http://www.towerswatson.com/en/Insights/IC-Types/Survey-Research-Results/2012/01/
Global-Pensions-Asset-Study-2012. Data in the following study is slightly revised and
Switzerland is excluded for the peculiarity of the Swiss occupational pension system. In
the seven most important markets, DC assets rose to 43% in 2011 from 38% in 2001.
Also, in countries where DC was of minor importance or even non-existent in 2001, DC
assets rose: in Canada from 3% to 4%, in Japan from 0% to 2%, and in the Netherlands
from 2% to 7%. The most significant increase was in the United Kingdom, from 8% to
39% (In 2012, the level stood at 26%).
11. Roth, Employee Participation, supra note 4, at 56–58.
12. Id.
13. See Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public and Private Enforcement of
Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 207 (2009). For a review
of La Porta et al. investor protection categories, see La Porta, et al., Law and Finance,
106 J. POL. ECON. NO. 6. 1113, 1122–25 (1998).
14. John Armour et al., How Do Legal Rules Evolve? Evidence From a CrossCountry Comparison of Shareholder, Creditor and Worker Protection, 57 AM. J. COMP.
L. 579, 611 (2009) (showing weaker shareholder protection from the board and other
shareholders in the United States than in Germany, the United Kingdom, France and
India).
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empowerment debate in the United States highlights this critique.15 In
continental Europe, nominating directors is a common mechanism for
investor protection.16 This mechanism is now available in the United
States as well—it is procedurually and economically feasible—with
pension funds having played a critical role in the political process.17
Interestingly, the United States played a central role in implementing
director primacy in German corporate governance.18 However, director
primacy has not gone so far as to exclude shareholders from nominating
directors.19
Besides the balance of shareholder rights and director primacy in
corporate governance, this article focuses on independent directors and
long-termism in times of pension capitalism. The independent director
paradigm was the first principle promoted by the Council of Institutional
Investors (“CII”), and was later accepted.20 On its website, CII stresses
that shareholders in the 1980s “had little say in most corporate
decisions,”21 suggesting that CII promoted and successfully launched
shareholder empowerment. Independent directors and shareholder
empowerment are linked insofar as director accountability is provided
by independent directors that, inter alia, are channels for expressing
concerns.22
15. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 188
HARV. L. REV. 833, 847 (2005) (pointing to the United Kingdom); see also Lucian A.
Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784, 1784–85 (2006)
(replying to Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006) and Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a
True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for
Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759 (2006)).
16. Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law Between the United States
and Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 697, 745–46
(2005).
17. For the Dodd-Frank Act, see infra Part III.A.1.
18. See infra Part III.B.
19. Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] I at 1089, last amended by the German Restructuring Act
(Restrukturierungsgesetz), Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900, art. 6 (Ger.), available at
http://www.nortonrose.com/files/german-stock-corporation-act-2010-englishtranslation-pdf-59656.pdf (explicitly providing for such a nomination right).
20. See Markus Roth, Unabhängige Aufsichtsratsmitglieder, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS
GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZHR] 605, 611 (2011) (Ger.).
21. See About Us, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (CII),
http://www.cii.org/about_us (last visited Jan. 20, 2013).
22. See infra Part II.
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A third main feature of corporate governance principles promoted
by both pension funds and pension fund associations is long-termism.23
This principle is not yet established. As the European Commission
highlighted in a recent Green Paper on corporate governance, pension
money does not lead to long-term investment.24 Long-termism is
nevertheless promoted in some company law principles, such as the
discharge of directors (backing of director actions) instead of mandatory
reelection, thereby incentivizing long-term strategies.25 Remuneration
in Germany is also now linked to the sustainable development of the
company.26 An issue that is yet to be discussed is whether different
levels and methods of pension funding contributed to global imbalances,
a matter of growing concern since the financial crisis. Due to
international diversification of assets and short-termism of asset
managers, sustainable development might be hindered; a detailed
analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this contribution.
Part I of the article begins by discussing labor and pensions as
determinants of the firm in a comparative perspective. While in the
United States and the United Kingdom labor plays a minor role in the
corporate governance of firms, in continental Europe co-determination
is not restricted to pension funds such as Hermes Fund Managers (UK)
or Californian Public Employees Retirement System (“CalPERS”)
(US).27 Moreover, while strict quotas for women on boards have been
implemented in some countries such as Norway, the Netherlands, Spain,
and France, the UK Corporate Governance Code introduces a more
flexible model.28 Other corporate governance principles correlate with
the rise of institutional investors; these investors are largely based in the
United Kingdom and the United States, but relevant in most
industrialized countries.29 Parts II and III of this article address the
already implemented features, such as independent directors and
shareholder empowerment.
These principles continue to spread
worldwide due to investments abroad; according to the US Treasury, US
23.
24.

See infra Part IV.
European Commission, Green Paper: The EU Corporate Governance
Framework, COM (2011) 164 final (Apr. 5, 2011) [hereinafter Green Paper].
25. See infra Part IV.B.2.
26. See infra Part IV.B.1.
27. Roth, Employee Participation, supra note 4, at 70–75.
28. See infra Part I.A.3–4.
29. For an early description, see Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman,
Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L.
REV. 863 (1991).
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portfolio holdings account for more than 10% of market capitalization in
Germany, Japan, South Korea, and France; up to 19% in the United
Kingdom; and 26% in Switzerland.30 Like long-termism, the core
corporate governance feature which is yet to be established—
independence and the balancing of shareholder rights with director
primacy—will be discussed in Part IV. This feature will be assessed in
the global perspective, taking into account country-specific peculiarities.
I. LABOR AND PENSIONS AS DETERMINANTS OF THE FIRM IN THE
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
A. LABOR IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES
1. Industrial Relations in Germany and the United States
Protection against dismissals is a central feature of German labor
law.
In plants with more than ten employees and for employment
contracts lasting at least six months, dismissals require good cause and
are subject to judicial review.32 By contrast, the United States is one of
the very few countries still subscribing to the employment-at-will
doctrine; restrictions concerning dismissal must be incorporated into the
employment contract.33 However, “business affairs” are considered
good cause for dismissals in Germany. Business judgment was first
31

30. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY ET AL., REPORT ON U.S. PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS OF
FOREIGN SECURITIES: AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2010, at 12 tbl.7 (2011) [hereinafter
PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS REPORT], available at http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/data-chart-center/tic/Pages/fpis.aspx.
31. The legal basis is the Kündigungsschutzgesetz [KSchG] [Protection Against
Dismissal Act], Aug. 10, 1951, BGBL. I at 1317, as amended (Ger.); see generally
ULRICH PREIS, PRINZIPIEN DES KÜNDIGUNGSRECHTS BEI ARBEITSVERHÄLTNISSEN
(1987).
32. Protection Against Dismissal Act §§ 1, 23. If employment contracts were in
force before January 1, 2004, a plant with more than five employees would be subject
to the rule. Id. § 23(2).
33. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 671–72 (Hornbook Series 2d
ed. 1999).
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introduced in Germany in this context,34 and only in 2005 was the
German business judgment rule adopted for director liability.35
In Germany, collective bargaining is performed, in principle,
industry-wide.36 This reflects the business structure in Germany, which
relies heavily on the concept of “Mittelstand” (small and medium
family-owned firms), as well as on large family-owned firms.37 Large
enterprises in particular, such as Volkswagen (“VW”), have enterprisespecific collective agreements. International studies show a correlation
between industry-wide collective bargaining and board-level codetermination.38
2. Employee Participation via Board Representatives in Germany
In Germany, a unique system of employee co-determination on
boards prevails.39 Stock corporations employing more than 2,000 within
Germany are subject to quasi-parity co-determination,40 while those

34. Markus Roth, Die betriebsbedingte Kündigung zwischen freier
Unternehmerentscheidung und Arbeitnehmerschutz, 30 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZIP] 1845, 1849 (2009) (Ger.).
35. Klaus J. Hopt & Markus Roth, in AKTIENGESETZ: GROßKOMMENTAR § 93 Abs.
1 Satz 2 (Klaus J. Hopt & Herbert Wiedemann eds., 4th ed. 2005) (Ger.); Markus Roth,
Outside Director Liability: German Stock Corporation Law in Transatlantic
Perspective, 8 J. CORP. L. STUD. 337 (2008) (U.K.) [hereinafter Roth, Outside Director
Liability].
36. For data, see Peter Ellguth & Susanne Kohaut, Tarifbindung und betriebliche
Interessenvertretung—aktuelle Ergebnisse aus dem IAB-Betriebspanel 2009, 63 WSIMITTEILUNGEN 204 (2010). For recent trends towards enterprise-specific collective
agreements and flexibility, see WOLF DIETER HEINBACH, TARIFBINDUNG,
LOHNSTRUKTUR UND TARIFVERTRAGLICHE FLEXIBILISIERUNGSPOTENZIALE (2009).
37. Even among the hundred largest German enterprises, only in twenty-one are
the majority of shares in dispersed ownership. German Monopolies Commission,
Neunzehntes Hauptgutachten der Monopolkommission 2010/2011, German
Parliamentary Papers 17/10365, at 165, ¶ 326.
38. See Gregory Jackson, Employee Representation in the Board Compared: A
Fuzzy Sets Analysis of Corporate Governance, Unionism and Political Institutions, 12
INDUSTRIELLE BEZIEHUNGEN 252 (2005).
39. Markus Roth, Die unternehmerische Mitbestimmung in der monistischen SE,
35 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ARBEITSRECHT [ZfA] 431, 432 (2004) (Ger.).
40. Gesetz über die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer [Mitbestimmungsgesetz]
[Act on Co-determination by Employees (Co-Determination Act)], May 4, 1976,
BGBL. I at 1153, last amended by the Act, Mar. 23 2002, BGBL. I at 1130 (Ger.),
available at http://www.bmwi.de/English/Redaktion/Pdf/__Archiv/labour-law/act-onco-determination-by-employees.
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employing more than 500 are subject to third-parity co-determination.41
For the coal, steel, and mining industries, a special parity codetermination regime was introduced shortly after World War II,42
laying the foundation for post-war employee participation at the board
level.43 The British government of the German industrial heartland of
Rhein/Ruhr established employee representation in part as an insurance
device against the re-militarization of Germany.44 Therefore, the
political dimension of co-determination is key;45 the same is true for the
objectives of progress in European company law.46
For German stock corporations, three models of employee
representation can be distinguished: third-parity co-determination,
introduced in 1952,47 and now under the One-Third Participation Act in
companies with more than 500 employees;48 quasi-parity codetermination under the Co-Determination Act of 1976 with a decisive
vote of the supervisory board’s chairman in companies with more than
2,000 employees;49 and parity composition of the board with an
41. Gesetz über die Drittelbeteiligung der Arbeitnehmer im Aufsichtsrat
[Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz] [One-Third Participation Act], May 18, 2004, BGBL. I at
974 (Ger.).
42. Gesetz über die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer in den Aufsichtsräten und
Vorständen der Unternehmen des Bergbaus und der Eisen und Stahl erzeugenden
Industrie [Co-Determination Act for the Coal, Steel and Mining Industry], May 21,
1951, BGBL. I at 347 (Ger.).
43. For the development of German board-level co-determination, see Hartmut
Oetker, Vorbemerkung zur Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer im Aufsichtsrat
[Foreword on Co-Determination], in AKTIENGESETZ: GROßKOMMENTAR COMMENT NO.
12 (Klaus J. Hopt & Herbert Wiedemann eds., 4th ed. 1999) (Ger.).
44. Roth, Die unternehmerische Mitbestimmung in der monistischen SE, supra
note 39, at 432–33.
45. See MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT (2003).
46. For an example of the political dimension in European private company law,
see Jan Bremer, Kompromissvorschlag zur Europäischen Privatgesellschaft (EPG)
vorgelegt, 2011 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [NZG] 695 (discussing
a proposal for compromise regarding the Societas Privata Europaea (a European statute
for close corporations)).
47

Introduced in 1952 as part of the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz [BetrVG] [Works
Council Constitution Act], Oct. 11, 1952, BGBL I at 681 (Ger.).

48. Section 1 (1) One-Third Participation Act, May 18, 2004, BGBL. I at 974
(Ger.).
49. See Co-Determination Act, May 4, 1976, BGBL. I at 1153, last amended by the
Act, Mar. 23 2002, BGBL. I at 1130, § 29(2) (Ger.). The chairman is typically a
shareholder representative. See Co-Determination Act § 27(1)–(2).
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independent member pursuant to the special co-determination regime in
the coal, steel and mining industries.50 The German co-determination
system allows only for the representation of workers employed in
Germany,51 which is strongly criticized.52 Supervisory board employee
representatives are required not only on the supervisory boards of
companies which themselves employ more than 500 employees, but also
on those of companies incorporated as stock corporations or limited
liability companies with subsidiaries employing more than 500
employees.53 In 2009, about 1,500 companies (695 stock corporations)
were subject to third-parity co-determination54 and about 700 companies
(280 stock corporations) were subject to quasi-parity co-determination.55
Thus, about 1,000 stock corporations in Germany are subject to codetermination.
Recent studies on the legal regimes in France and Portugal show
significant effects from basing labor protection on productivity and firm

50. In 2002, 45 companies reported having such a structure. See Klaus J. Hopt &
Markus Roth, in AKTIENGESETZ: GROßKOMMENTAR, supra note 35, § 96, ¶ 13.
51. For a reform proposal, see G. Bachmann, T. Baums, M. Habersack,
M. Henssler, M. Lutter, H. Oetker and P. Ulmer, Entwurf einer Regelung zur Mitbestimmungsvereinbarung sowie zur Größe des mitbestimmten Aufsichtsrats (Arbeitskreis
Unternehmerische Mitbestimmung), 30 ZIP 885 (2009).
52. NICO RAABE, DIE MITBESTIMMUNG IM AUFSICHTSRAT: THEORIE UND
WIRKLICHKEIT IN DEUTSCHEN AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN 333 (2011); Hans-Jürgen
Hellwig & Caspar Behme, Gemeinschaftsrechtliche Probleme der deutschen
Unternehmensmitbestimmung, 54 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT [AG] 261 (2009); HansJürgen Hellwig & Caspar Behme, Zur Einbeziehung ausländischer Belegschaften in die
deutsche Unternehmensmitbestimmung, Stellungnahme zum Entwurf des Arbeitskreises
“Unternehmerische Mitbestimmung”, 30 ZIP 1791 (2009); Hans-Jürgen Hellwig &
Caspar Behme, Gemeinschaftsrechtswidrigkeit und Anwendungsvorrang des
Gemeinschaftsrechts in der deutschen Unternehmensmitbestimmung, 31 ZIP 871
(2010); Volker Rieble & Clemens Latzel, Inlandsmitbestimmung als
Ausländerdiskriminierung bei Standortkonflikten, 4 EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
ARBEITSRECHT [EuZA] 145 (2011). Many German companies are reincorporating as
European companies to bypass this regime. See Roth, Employee Participation, supra
note 4, at 72.
53. One-Third Participation Act § 2 (more than 500 employees); Co-Determination
Act § 5 (more than 2000 employees).
54. Walter Bayer & Thomas Hoffmann, AG-Report: Aktienrecht in Zahlen,
Drittelbeteiligung der Arbeitnehmer im Aufsichtsrat, in SONDERTEIL DER ZEITSCHRIFT
DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 151, 153 (2010).
55. Statistiken
zur
Mitbestimmungslandschaft,
HANS-BÖCKLER-STIFTUNG,
http://www.boeckler.de/38347.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2012).
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size.56 The effects of co-determination on the legal form chosen by
companies have become apparent with hindsight: after limiting
mandatory co-determination for newly-founded stock corporations to
companies with more than 500 employees in 1994, the number of
registered stock corporations in Germany rose from under 3,000 to
about 17,000.57 According to the statistics of labor representatives, the
number of stock corporations, as well as the overall number of
companies subject to quasi-parity co-determination, is in decline.58
3. Shifting Demographics: Participation of Older People and Women in
the Labor Market
Globally, the first wave of the so-called “baby boomers” is retiring,
and in many countries birth rates are lower than needed for the
replication of age cohorts.59 Due to greater life expectancy and lower
fertility, demographics are shifting in Germany even more than in the
United States, though they may be more heavily discussed in the latter.60
Life expectancy grew more or less linearly in prior decades, leading to
added years in retirement, even considering prospected rises in pension
age.61 To counteract the surge of public debt without further reforms,62
state pensions designed as pay-as-you-go schemes in Germany, as well
56. Luis Garicano, Claire Lelarge & John Van Reenen, Firm Size Distortions and
the Productivity Distribution: Evidence from France (London Sch. Of Econ., Ctr. of
Econ. Performance, CEP Discussion Paper No. 1128, 2012); Serguey Braguinsky, Lee
G. Branstetter & Andre Regateiro, The Incredible Shrinking Portuguese Firm (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17,265, 2011).
57. Walter Bayer & Thomas Hoffmann, AG-Report: Aktienrecht in Zahlen,
Statistiken zur AG – eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme, in SONDERTEIL DER ZEITSCHRIFT
DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 283, 286 (2010) (finding 16,998 registered stock corporations
in Germany as of June 1, 2010). At the end of 1993, 3,085 stock corporations were
reported. See Deutsche Bundesbank, Kapitalmarktstatistik, März 2012, available at
http://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/Veroeffentlichungen/Statistische
_Beihefte_2/2012/2012_03_kapitalmarktstatistik.pdf?__blob=publicationFile
58. See HANS-BÖCKLER-STIFTUNG, www.boeckler.de.
59. OECD, PENSIONS AT A GLANCE: 2011, supra note 2.
60. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE (1995); LAWRENCE A.
FROLIK & RICHARD L. KAPLAN, ELDER LAW IN A NUTSHELL (5th ed. 2010).
61. OECD, Pensions at a Glance 2011, supra note 2, at 34.
62. STANDARD & POOR’S, GLOBAL AGING 2010: AN IRREVERSIBLE TRUTH 33 tbl.3
(2010), available at http://www.apapr.ro/images/stories/materiale/COMUNICATE/
2010/2010%2031%20attach.pdf (estimated German net government debt as a
percentage of GDP of 400% in 2050).
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as slightly improving birth rates for women born in 1969 or later63—and
expected by the United Nations64—are of great importance. The
European Commission responded by launching Europe 2020,65 which
aims to improve participation of women and older people in the labor
market.66 Both participation rates have already risen; in particular, there
might be a correlation between the participation rates of women and
early steps of legislation concerning the right to work part-time67 and the
provision of paternity leave.68
The much-discussed female quota in boardrooms, a central feature
in European corporate governance,69 should be viewed against this
backdrop.
European Commissioner Viviane Reding regularly
announces a quota as part of the Agenda 2020. In 2004, Norway
imposed a quota of 40% for women on boards, with others such as Spain
and France following suit.70 The glass ceiling is well documented in
U.S. economic and social literature,71 but neither the United States nor
63. Joshua R. Goldstein & Michaela Kreyenfeld, Has East Germany Overtaken
West Germany? Recent Trends in Order-Specific Fertility, 37 POPULATION & DEV.
REV. 453, 464 (2011).
64. OECD, PENSIONS AT A GLANCE: 2011, supra note 2, at 163 (expecting fertility
rate to increase to 1.69 in 2045-2050 from 1.32 in 2005-2010). For fertility rates from
1960 to 2010, determined based on a tempo-adjusted method, see Marc Luy, Tempo
Effects and their Relevance in Demographic Analysis, 35 COMP. POPULATION STUD.
415, 431 (2010); Marc Luy & Olga Pötzsch, Estimates of the Tempo-adjusted Total
Fertility Rate in Western and Eastern Germany, 1955–2008, 35 COMP. POPULATION
STUDIES 605, 621 (2010) (finding a tempo-adjusted total fertility rate of 1.65 in 2007).
65. See Communication from the Commission: Europe 2020 – A Strategy for
Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth, COM (2010) 2020 final (Mar. 5, 2010).
66. Id. at 10 (“The employment rate of the population aged 20-64 should increase
from the current 69% to at least 75%, including through the greater involvement of
women, older workers and the better integration of migrants in the work force.”).
67. Teilzeit- und Befristungsgesetz [TzBfG] [Part-Time and Fixed-Term
Employment Act], Dec. 21, 2000, BGBL. I at 1966, last amended by Gesetz [G], Dec.
20, 2011, BGBL. I at 2854 (Ger.).
68. Bundeselterngeld- und Elternzeitgesetz [BEEG] [Federal Parental Allowance
and Parental Leave Act], Dec. 5, 2006, BGBL. I at 2748, last amended by G, Sept. 10,
2012, BGBL. I at 1878 (Ger.).
69. See Katja Langenbucher, Zentrale Akteure der Corporate Governance:
Zusammensetzung des Aufsichtsrats, Zum Vorschlag einer obligatorischen
Besetzungserklärung, ZGR 314, 322 (2012) (Ger.).
70. For an early discussion of the reform movement, see Poonam Puri, The Future
of Stakeholder Interests in Corporate Governance 48 CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 427, 442
(2010). In France, the quota of 40% has to be fulfilled by companies in 2017.
71. See FEDERAL GLASS CEILING COMMISSION, GOOD FOR BUSINESS: MAKING FULL
USE
OF
THE
NATION’S
HUMAN
CAPITAL
(1995),
available
at
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the United Kingdom has imposed a binding quota. In the United States,
the SEC has called for policy statements from issuers.72 Meanwhile, in
the United Kingdom, the U.K. Corporate Governance Code will be
amended in 2012 to require a special section on diversity in a company’s
Annual Report.73 Early U.S. studies showed positive results for diverse
boards,74 and recent economic literature suggests that radical gender
shifts in the composition of boards can cause financial harm to
companies without women on their boards.75
4. Introduction of a 40% Quota with (Quasi-) Parity Co-determination?
Diversity is currently the hottest debate in German corporate
governance.76 In its response to the Report of the Government
Commission on German Corporate Governance, the government
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1118&context=key_w
orkplace.
72. See Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, Securities Act Release No. 9089,
Exchange Act Release No. 61,175, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,092, 74
Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,364 (Dec. 16, 2009) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § § 229.407 (2012))
(disclosure on diversity, strategy and implementation by the nomination committee).
73. FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, FEEDBACK STATEMENT: GENDER DIVERSITY ON
BOARDS 5 (2011) (announcing to amend provision B.2.4 of the UK Corporate
Governance Code in 2012 as follows (in italics): “A separate section of the annual
report should describe the work of the nomination committee, including the process it
has used in relation to board appointments. This section should include a description of
the board’s policy on diversity, including gender, any measurable objectives that it has
set for implementing the policy, and progress on achieving the objectives. An
explanation should be given if neither an external search consultancy nor open
advertising has been used in the appointment of a chairman or a non executive
director.”).
74. David A. Carter et al., Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and Firm
Value, 38 FIN. REV. 33 (2003).
75. For Norway: Kenneth R. Ahern & Amy K. Dittmar, The Changing of the
Boards: The Impact on Firm Valuation of Mandated Female Board Representation,
127 Q. J. ECON. 137 (2012).
76. Gregor Bachmann, Zur Umsetzung einer Frauenquote im Aufsichtsrat, 32 ZIP
1131 (2011); Langenbucher, supra note 69; Julia Redenius-Hövermann, Zur
Frauenquote im Aufsichtsrat, 31 ZIP 660 (2010); Claudia Schubert & Gönke Jacobsen,
Personelle Vielfalt als Element guter Unternehmensführung - die Empfehlung des
Corporate Governance Kodex und die Rechtsfolgen ihrer unzureichenden
Berücksichtigung, 2-3 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFT UND BANKRECHT [WM] 726
(2011); Daniela Weber-Rey & Friederike Handt, Vielfalt/Diversity im Kodex Selbstverpflichtung, Bemühenspflicht und Transparenz, NZG 1 (2011).
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stressed that politicians expect improvement in the participation of
women in supervisory and management boards.77 However, the way in
which stronger participation of women in the boardroom should be
implemented is not yet clear. Leading German company directors,
politicians, and even the government are split over the question of
whether a legal rule, as in Norway, the Netherlands, and France, should
be enacted.78 Some commentators have questioned whether the
Corporate Governance Commission had a mandate to include diversity
in the German Code,79 and whether a legal quorum for women would be
in line with the German Constitution80 and the European antidiscrimination rules.81
For a better understanding of the German discussion on diversity,
one needs to consider that the German supervisory board is already
highly politicized.82
Taking into account quasi-mandatory codetermination in big companies, implementing a 40% quota, as
advocated by the Green Party,83 Social Democratic Party,84 and in
September 201285 by the upper house of the German parliament

77. STELLUNGNAHME
DER
BUNDESREGIERUNG
ZUM
BERICHT
DER
REGIERUNGSKOMMISSION DEUTSCHER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE KODEX [OPINION OF
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ON THE REPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT COMMISSION ON
GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE] 1 (2010).
78. For discussion, see Katja Langenbucher, Frauenquote und Gesellschaftsrecht,
66 JURISTENZEITUNG [JZ] 1038 (2011).
79. Peter O. Mülbert & Alexander Wilhelm, Grundfragen des Deutschen
Corporate Governance Kodex und der Entsprechenserklärung nach § 161 AktG, 176
ZHR 286, 321–23 (2012).
80. Gerald Spindler & Kathrin Brandt, Verfassungsrechtliche Zulässigkeit einer
Gleichstellungsquote im Aufsichtsrat der börsennotierten AG, 2011 NZG 401, 404–05;
more flexible in this regard is Hans-Jürgen Papier & Martin Heidebach, Die Einführung
einer gesetzlichen Frauenquote für die Aufsichtsräte deutscher Unternehmen unter
verfassungsrechtlichen Aspekten, 2011 ZGR 305.
81. Jobst-Hubertus Bauer, Gesetzliche Quote: Verfassungsrechtlich kaum haltbar!,
BETRIEBSBERATER [BB] I (2001:48); more flexible in this regard is Kathrin Brandt &
Alexander Thiele, Zulässigkeit einer Gleichstellungsquote im Aufsichtsrat unter
Berücksichtigung der Rechtsprechung des EuGH, 2011 AG 580.
82. For co-determination, see ROE, supra note 45, at 29–37; see also id. at 71–82
(country analysis).
83. Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksachen und Protokolle [BT] 17/3296 (Ger.).
84. SPD-Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Förderung der Chancengleichheit von
Männern und Frauen in Wirtschaftsunternehmen (ChGlFöG) [Equal Opportunities
Draft Bill of the Social Democratic Party], BT 17/8878 (Ger.).
85. For further developments in 2013, see infra text accompanying note 112.
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(Bundesrat),86 would only allow shareholders to freely choose three out
of ten directors. This might explain why the industry took the German
Corporate Governance Code itself off the agenda—to hinder future
action.87 Even if a repeal of the German Corporate Governance Code
was highly unlikely due to this industry pressure, 2011 was the second
year since the German Corporate Governance Code’s 2002 enactment in
which it was not amended. However, a broad discussion of a quota for
women on boards switched to a discussion of introducing a legal quota.
On the basis of a report by Mathias Habersack on state and parastatal
interventions in corporate governance (“Habersack Report”),88 the
German Jurist Forum recommended an evaluation of experiences in
other European countries, but not an introduction of a legal (binding or
flexible) quota for German boards.89
While the German discussion has largely neglected European
initiatives,90 issues such as shortcomings in the compatibility of family
life with a woman’s career, as well as better conditions in neighboring
countries, have been stressed.91 Empirical research shows a correlation
86. Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Förderung gleichberechtigter Teilhabe von Frauen
und Männern in Führungsgremien (GlTeilhG) [Promotion of Gender Equality in
Management Bodies], BUNDESRAT DRUCKSACHEN [BR] 330/12 (Beschluss).
87. Kremer, who comments on the Code, see HENRIK-MICHAEL RINGLEB, THOMAS
KREMER, MARCUS LUTTER & AXEL V. WERDER, KOMMENTAR ZUM DEUTSCHEN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE KODEX (4th ed. 2010), and published an article on the Code,
see Thomas Kremer, Der Deutsche Corporate Governance Kodex auf dem Prüfstand:
bewährte Selbst- oder freiwillige Überregulierung?, 32 ZIP 1177 (2011), is chief
compliance officer of ThyssenKrupp.
88. MATHIAS HABERSACK, STAATLICHE UND HALBSTAATLICHE EINGRIFFE IN DIE
UNTERNEHMENSFÜHRUNG, GUTACHTEN E ZUM 69. DEUTSCHEN JURISTENTAG, MÜNCHEN
34–43 (2012).
89. 69. DEUTSCHER JURISTENTAG MÜNCHEN 2012: BESCHLÜSSE [69TH GERMAN
JURISTS FORUM, MUNICH 2012: DECISIONS], Abteilung Wirtschaftsrecht [Business Law
Section], Staatliche und halbstaatliche Eingriffe in die Unternehmensführung,
Resolution I.3, at 17 (Ger.) [hereinafter GERMAN JURISTS FORUM, MUNICH 2012].
90. See Green Paper, supra note 24, at 6–7 (concerning strategy for equality
between women and men); Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions, at 7, COM (2010) 0491 final (Sept. 21, 2010) (concerning
initiatives to improve gender balance in decision-making); see also the comparative
overview in European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper: The Gender
Balance in Business Leadership, SEC (2011) 246 final (Mar. 1, 2011).
91. Martin Peltzer, Der Bericht der Corporate Governance Kommission an die
Bundesregierung, 2011 NZG 281, 283 (Ger.).
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between the absence of women on supervisory boards and their
exclusion in German supervisory board networks; it also shows that
supervisory board networks that do have a woman on a supervisory
board tend to place more women on other boards.92 Since the literature
on positive economic effects of women in boardrooms is predominately
from the United States,93 where only about 17% of the independent
directors are women,94 a more cautious and evolutionary approach might
be appropriate for European lawmaking on diversity. At the moment, a
self-binding declaration of larger companies seems to be the most
feasible policy option.95 Whether there will be a legal duty to make such
a declaration is not yet clear. In October 2011, the DAX 30-companies
declared that they were aiming to enhance the proportion of women in
higher management;96 all but two made self-binding declarations, which
generally aimed for significant future improvement.
Quotas in
individual companies currently range from 7.6% to 28.5%; however,
quota increase goals aim to raise this range from over 10% to 32%
between 2015 and 2020; the company with the highest ratio today plans
to increase its quota by between 1% and 2% per year.97
In March 2012, the parliamentary group (Fraktion) of the German
Social Democratic Party (“SPD”) introduced a legislative initiative
proposing a quota for supervisory boards of 30% female in 2013 and
40% in 2015.98 Within the German government, three ministers, all of
whom are women, are involved in this issue. The Minister of Labor
(Mrs. Von der Leyen) supports a quota,99 the Minister of Family (Mrs.
Schröder) proposes a flexible quota (Flexiquote) set by the companies
92. Michael Wolff et al., Der Einfluss der Aufsichtsratszusammensetzung auf die
Präsenz
von
Frauen
in
Aufsichtsräten,
2010
ZEITSCHRIFT
FÜR
BETRIEBSWIRTSCHAFTLICHE FORSCHUNG [zfbf] 503, 523 (Ger.).
93. See, e.g., Carter et al., supra note 74.
94. SPENCER STUART, 2012 SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 16 (2012) (finding
17% of independent directors are women, up from 12 % in 2000).
95. A study for the Ministry for Family, Elder, Woman and Youth is presented by
Marc-Philippe Weller (University of Freiburg), see FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE
ZEITUNG 19 (Aug. 6, 2011) (on file with author).
96. Florian Gathmann & Christian Teevs, Zwei Ministerinnen im Quotenkampf,
SPIEGEL ONLINE (Oct. 17, 2011, 6:57 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/
0,1518,792261,00.html (Ger.).
97. Id.
98. Equal Opportunities Draft Bill, BT 17/8878 (Ger.).
99. See Gesetz geplant: Von der Leyen will Frauenquote bis 2013 durchboxen,
SPIEGEL ONLINE (June 16, 2011, 11:07 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/
gesetz-geplant-von-der-leyen-will-frauenquote-bis-2013-durchboxen-a-768884.html.
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themselves, and the Minister of Justice (Mrs. LeutheuserSchnarrenberger) rejects a quota outright.100 The Prime Minister, Mrs.
Merkel, is said to swing towards the promoters of a mandatory quota.101
In December 2012 the German conservatives agreed to the introduction
of a flexible quota.102 Consequently, the German Government at least
initially rejected the European proposal for a strict quota.103
The details of the legislative proposal are as follows: from 2013,
supervisory boards shall consist of 30% women and management boards
shall consist of 20% women.104 From 2015, management boards with
four managing directors shall consist of 25% women and management
boards with at least nine members shall consist of (at least) 40%
women.105 For supervisory boards, women shall make up at least 40%
of the board (if the number of directors greater than three).106 The quota
for the supervisory board would apply to both shareholder and employee
representatives.107 Due to the separate counting of men and women for
employee and shareholder representatives,108 the 2013 quotas will
effectively already be higher. The sanctions for failing to comply are
important, as elections for supervisory board members shall only be

100. See Kerstin Schwenn & Hendrik Kafsack, Schröder will ein Gesetz zur
flexiblen Frauenquote, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (June 14 , 2012), available
at
http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/gleichbehandlung-schroeder-will-ein-gesetzzur-flexiblen-frauenquote-11786059.html; Justizministerin will Konzernen bis 2013
Zeit geben, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Oct. 17, 2011, 8:42 AM), http://www.spiegel.de/politik/
deutschland/gesetzliche-frauenquote-justizministerin-will-konzernen-bis-2013-zeitgeben-a-792124.html.
101. Merkel bei Frauenquote auf Schröders Seite, HANDELSBLATT, (July 23, 2012,
3:01 PM) (Ger.), http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/fuehrungspositionenmerkel-bei-frauenquote-auf-schroeders-seite/6910712.html.
102. See Christlich Demokratische Union, 25. Parteitag der CDU Deutschlands,
Beschluss: Starkes Deutschland. Chancen für Alle!, Kompetenzen von Frauen besser
nutzen 7–8 (Dec. 2012), available at http://www.cdu.de/sites/default/files/media/
dokumente/antrag-starkes-deutschland-chancen-fuer-alle.pdf.
103. “Einsatz für Frauenquote war nie mehr als Schamschlägerei”, SÜDDEUTSCHE
ZEITUNG, Mar. 6, 2013, at 5. For later developments infra note 112.
104. Equal Opportunities Draft Bill, BT 17/8878, art. 1, 13 no. 1.
105. Id., art. 2, 13 no. 2 (to be codified at German Stock Corporation Act § 76(4)).
106. Id., art. 2, 13 no. 2 (to be codified at German Stock Corporation Act § 96 (4)
1).
107. Id., art. 1, 2, 13 (to be codified at German Stock Corporation Act § 96 (3) 1, (4)
1).
108. Id., art. 1, 13 no. 1 (to be codified at German Stock Corporation Act § 96 (3)).
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possible if the quotas are met.109 If the election fails for this reason and
it is not resolved during the next annual general meeting, another
proposed provision will apply: if the supervisory board does not satisfy
the quota provided for by law or the articles of association, it will no
longer be able to take resolutions.110 According to the proposal of the
German Upper House of September 2012 and the current proposal by
the Social Democratic Party and the Green Party, a 40% quota for larger
supervisory boards shall be introduced until 2023.111 Shortly before the
German Bundestag rejected that proposal in April 2013, the German
conservatives agreed to implement a call for a 30% quota in 2020 in its
programme for the elections in September 2013.112
The United Kingdom contributes to the debate in another way by
amending the UK Corporate Governance Code to provide for a flexible
quota. Transparency is also to be provided due to a proposed European
directive amending the European Audit Directives.113 Economists
studying the Norwegian experience showed that companies with less
than two women on their boards suffered from having to implement the
high quota of 40% all at once.114 In 2012, the German government
published the Eighth Family Report115 calling for part-time employment
for senior employees as well, which may lead to more qualified women
in the future.

109. Id., art. 1, 13 no. 1 (to be codified at German Stock Corporation Act § 101
(1a)).
110. Id., art. 1, 13 no. 1 (to be codified at German Stock Corporation Act § 108 (2)
5).
111. Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Förderung gleichberechtigter Teilhabe von Frauen
und Männdern in Führungsgremien (GlTeilhG), supra note 88. See also DEUTSCHER
BUNDESTAG: GESETZENTWURF [BT] 17/11139, Art. 2, 16, providing tax-consequences
for non-compliance with Art. 13.
112. The conservatives overruled the party resolution of December 2012. See
Gender Gap: Germany Rejects Law Requiring Board Quotas, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Apr.
18, 2013, 6:51 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/germany-rejects-lawrequiring-board-quotas-a-895238.html.
113. Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council amdending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC as regards
disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large companies and
groups, at art. 1 (2), COM (2013) 207 final (Apr. 16, 2013).
114. See Ahern & Dittmar, supra note 75 at 162–69, 192–94.
115. BUNDESMINISTERIUM FÜR FAMILIE, SENIOREN, FRAUEN UND JUGEND, ZEIT FÜR
FAMILIE, FAMILIENZEITPOLITIK ALS CHANCE EINER NACHHALTIGEN FAMILIENPOLITIK,
ACHTER FAMILIENBERICHT DER BUNDESREGIERUNG (2012).
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B. PENSION SYSTEM IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES
1. The German Focus on State Pensions and Life Insurance
In the nineteenth century, Germany introduced the well-known
Bismarck pension laws.116 Less known is the academic foundation for
introducing social security. Viewed from a twenty-first century
perspective, German social security might be seen as an early result of
law and economy.117
Early German economists promoted the
introduction of social security.
Corresponding to the Austrian
“Nationalökonomie,” the German “Verein für Socialpolitik” (German
Economic Association) promoted a solution for the “soziale Frage”
(social question).118 Heavy critique resulted in the phrasing of
“Kathedersozialist” (lectern-socialist), which is still rooted in German
language.119 At that time, German social security was capital-funded,
providing disability as well as pension insurance.120 The retirement age
was 70,121 equal or even greater to the average life expectancy at the
time.122 Capital-funded state pensions were later given up due to the
First World War and hyperinflation in the 1920s.123 Today, the German

116. Gesetz betreffend die Invaliditäts- und Altersversicherung [Disability and OldAge Insurance Act], June 22, 1889, RGBL. at 97 (Ger.).
117. Kristoffel Grechenig & Martin Gelter, Divergente Evolution des Rechtsdenkens
– Von amerikanischer Rechtsökonomie und deutscher Dogmatik, 72 RABELS
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT [RabelsZ] 513
(2008) (Ger.); Kristoffel Grechenig & Martin Gelter, The Transatlantic Divergence in
Legal Thought: American Law and Economics vs. German Doctrinalism, 31 HASTINGS
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 295 (2008).
118. In the nineteenth century, up to 40% of the German Economic Association’s
members were lawyers. For the economic analysis of German labor law up until the
Weimar Republic, see Markus Roth, 150 Jahre Recht des Handlungsgehilfen: Vom
ADHGB 1861 zum Arbeits(vertrags)gesetz(buch), 2012 RECHT DER ARBEIT [RDA] 1,
5–6.
119. See Informationen über den Vfs, VEREIN FÜR SOCIALPOLITIK (Apr. 2011),
http://www.socialpolitik.org/vfs.php?mode=informationen&lang=1.
120. Gesetz Betreffend die Invaliditäts- und Altersversicherung [Disability and OldAge Insurance Act], June 22, 1889, RGBL. §§ 20(2), 21 (Ger.).
121.
Id. § 9(5).
122. For commentary on the development of life expectancy, see Jim Oeppen &
James W. Vaupel, Broken Limits to Life Expectancy, 296 SCIENCE 1029 (2002).
123. For a criticism of the concept of investment in assets of insurance companies
analogous to the legal rules for guardians in light of hyperinflation, see MARKUS ROTH,
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state pension is a pay-as-you-go scheme and and provides for most of
Germany’s retirement income—this is the real first pullar.124 Since the
so-called Riester-reform, the second and third pillars (private pensions
such as occupational pensions and individual pensions, respectively)
have gained momentum.125 The fact that the third pillar occupies a
greater role in society than the second pillar causes widely-accepted cost
efficiency problems.
2. Employee participation Via Private Pensions in the United States
In the United States, more emphasis is placed on occupational
pensions;126 social security is not as close to the insurance principle as it
is in the German system. Unlike in Germany, US state pensions were
never expected to provide a full retirement income for large parts of the
population.127 United States pension assets are therefore by far the
greatest asset in US capital markets and account for almost half of the
world’s occupational pension assets.128 This is attributed to both state
pension funds and a ‘union pension premium.’129 As of 2008, state
pension funds were said to hold one-fifth of US-listed equity.130 Even if
they hold only one-tenth of US equity,131 state pension funds play a
PRIVATE ALTERSVORSORGE: BETRIEBSRENTENRECHT UND INDIVIDUELLE VORSORGE
296–98 (2009) [hereinafter ROTH, PRIVATE ALTERSVORSORGE 2009].
124. OECD, OECD PENSIONS OUTLOOK 2012, at 207 (2012).
125. Ulrich Becker, Staatliche Alterssicherung, in RECHT DER ÄLTEREN 321, 325
(Ulrich Becker & Markus Roth eds. 2013).
126. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW (5th ed.
2010); DAN M. MCGILL ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS (9th ed. 2010).
127. MCGILL, supra note 126. On the role of social security in the US Retirement
System, see id. at 45–85.
128. TOWERS WATSON, supra note 2, at 7 (In 2012, total pension assets in the US
accounted for $16.851 trillion out of the $29.754 trillion of total pension assets among
the thirteen major pension markets); OECD, PENSIONS AT A GLANCE 2011, supra note
2, at 179 ($9.58 trillion out of $16.78 trillion in 2009, the latter number representing
OECD countries).
129. Teresa Ghilarducci, Organized Labor and Pensions, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
PENSIONS AND RETIREMENT INCOME 381, 385 (Gordon L. Clark et al. eds., 2006).
130. Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence on the
Developing Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance, 61 VAND. L. REV.
315, 316 (2008).
131. THE CONFERENCE BOARD, THE 2010 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT REPORT 25–
26; Martin Gelter, The Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder Primacy 33,
(Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2079607, 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2079607.
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pivotal role in shaping corporate governance in the United States and
worldwide due to the sheer size of their investment portfolios: it was
CalPERS which paved the way for activist corporate governance by
shareholders.132 As an association primarily representing the state
pension funds, CII was instrumental in promoting the independent
director paradigm and the corporate governance rules under the DoddFrank Act.133
3. Occupational Pensions in Germany
A union pension premium as seen in the United States134 is not
common in Germany. While occupational pensions in Germany are
widespread in the financial and chemical industries, industrywide
pension provisions—as in the electro and metal industries—are
relatively new phenomenons, having been introduced in 2001.135
Metallrente, a joint-venture of the employer association Gesamtmetall
and the union IG Metall, now owns assets of 1.5 billion Euros. Unlike
in Switzerland and the Netherlands, occupational pensions in Germany
are not subject to collective bargaining by the unions.136 In some cases,
there is collective bargaining of works councils at the plant level.137 In
the case of Metallrente, providing occupational pensions is merely a
choice for the employee, and not a duty.138
Direct pension promises is the default rule in Germany, and until
2001, pension promises were mandatorily linked to the earnings of the
company for adjustments in retirement.139 The German Occupational
Pensions Act provides that pensions have to be adjusted for inflation if
the financial situation of the company allows for it.140 The German
Federal Labor Court ruled that adjustments do not have to be paid for
132. Michael P. Smith, Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence
from CalPERS, 51 J. FIN. 221 230–32 (1996).
133. See infra Part III.A.1, IV.A.1.
134. Teresa Ghilarducci, Organized Labor and Pensions, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
PENSIONS AND RETIREMENT INCOME 381, 385 (Gordon L. Clark et al. eds., 2006).
135. See Stark für die Zukunft - Vorsorge mit MetallRente, METALLRENTE,
http://www.metallrente.de (last visited Jan. 29, 2013).
136. ROTH, PRIVATE ALTERSVORSORGE 2009, supra note 123, at 324.
137. Id. at 319–20.
138. See METALLRENTE, supra note 135.
139. Betriebsrentengesetz [BetrAVG] [Occupational Pensions Act], Dec. 19, 1974,
BGBL. I at 3610, § 16 (Ger.).
140. ROTH, PRIVATE ALTERSVORSORGE 2009, supra note 123, at 638–50.
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out of the substance (assets), but rather from the revenues of the
company, and of the revenues, that a reasonable interest rate—the
interest rate for secured bonds plus 2%—has to be left out to allow for
further investments as well as an appropriate return on investment in
order to secure the existence of the company first.141
Pensions of state employees in Germany are at best partly
The biggest German public pension fund is the
funded.142
“Versorgungsanstalt des Bundes und der Länder” (VBL), which
provides occupational pensions for public employees at the federal and
state levels and has over €16 billion under management,143 compared to
CalPERS $257 billion.144 In the United States, a large proportion of
pension assets are held by public pension funds,145 even if the
underfunding of such funds is a subject of concern.
Neither Germany nor the United States is likely to exercise best
practices in pension policy. According to data provided by the OECD,
Germany and the United States provide under-average replacement
ratios, especially for low incomes.146 Moreover, only a minority of the
working age population is enrolled in an occupational pension plan.147
Therefore, in both the United States and Germany, automatic
enrollment, as in the UK Pension Act 2008,148 would enhance prospects
for future retirees. Such reform has been suggested in Germany, inter
alia, by the German Jurist Forum in 2004 and the Association for
Occupational Pensions (“Arbeitsgemeinschaft für betriebliche
Altersversorgung, AbA”) in 2011, as well as in the United States by
various authors on the basis of several empirical studies.149
141. Bundesarbeitsgericht [BAG] [Federal Labour Supreme Court], 18.2.2003, 3
AZR 172/02, Entscheidungen des Bundesarbeitsgerichts [BAGE] 105, 72, 77.
142. This contrasts with other countries such as the US and Japan. Worldwide, the
biggest pension funds are public pension funds. See WATSON WYATT INTERNATIONAL,
INVESTMENT MATTERS 2008, at 32 (2008).
143. See Die Vermögensanlage der VBL, VBL, http://www.vbl.de/de/wir_ueber_
uns/vermoegensanlage/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2013).
144. CalPERS Investments, CALPERS (May 28, 2013), http://www.calpers.ca.gov/
index.jsp?bc=/investments/home.xml.
145. OECD PENSIONS OUTLOOK 2012, supra note 124, at 228.
146. Id. at 207.
147. Id. at 104 (about one-half of the workers).
148. 2008, c. 30, Pensions Act 2008 § 3 (U.K.). See DEP’T FOR WORK AND
PENSIONS, PENSIONS BILL - IMPACT ASSESSMENT 45 (2008) (U.K.).
149. See George A. Akerlof, Behavioral Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic
Behavior, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 411, 424 (2002); Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea,
The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.
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4. Corporate Finance and the Trend from Defined Benefits to Defined
Contributions
In the 1970s, Peter Drucker estimated that pension funds of the
private sector held a quarter of all listed equity in the United States.150
Since then, employee stock ownership programs (ESOPs) have been
strongly promoted.151 David Blake estimates that United Kingdom
companies in the late twenteeth century owned a third of each other via
their pension funds.152 In post-World War II Germany, direct pension
promises (“Direktzusagen”) contributed about 20% to self-financing of
German firms.153 Due to the trend towards asset funding and
international investments in equity (advisors conversely refer to a home
bias in promoting international investments), direct and indirect selffinancing is in decline.
Pursuant to ERISA,154 asset funding has been legally required since
Whether such asset funding is
1974 in the United States.155
counteracting the alignment of employee and employer interests is now
subject to discussion in the United States. The idea behind the
promotion of occupational, and not state, pensions by General Motors in
the 1950s was to invest in the American economy.156 In the aftermath of
the 2008 financial crisis, General Motors had to file for insolvency due
to pension and health care obligations.157 This is expected to result in
J. ECON. 1149 (2001); J. Michael Orszag & Peter R. Orszag, Individual Accounts:
Lessons from International Experience, 309 SCIENCE 250 (2005); James M. Poterba,
Individual Decision-Making and Risk in Defined Contribution Plans, 13 ELDER L.J.
285, 291 (2005).
150. DRUCKER, supra note 5, at 1.
151. Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms,
Codetermination and Economic Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1749, 1752 (1990).
152. BLAKE, supra note 7, at 575.
153. Günter
Felix,
Die
steuerliche
Behandlung
von
betrieblichen
Pensionsverpflichtungen, 1958 RDA 89.
154. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C. §§
1001-1461 & scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (2006).
155. For origins and structure of ERISA, see JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., PENSION
AND EMPLOYMENT BENEFIT LAW ch. 3, 78–145 (5th ed. 2010).
156. DRUCKER, supra note 5, at 5 (“Socialism came to America [through the efforts
of] the most unlikely revolutionary of them all—the chief executive officer of
America’s largest manufacturing company, General Motors.”).
157. For underfunding of the General Motors pension plan, see Leigh A. Wolfe, Is
Your Pension Safe? A Call for Reform of the Pension Guaranty Corporation and
Protection of Pension Benefits, 24 SW. U. L. REV. 145, 179 (1994).
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further caution towards defined benefit promises, and is likely to propel
the trend towards defined contributions even more.158
The trend from defined benefit to defined contribution must be seen
against the backdrop of the lack of, or at least limited, financial risk for
employers until the era of codification of occupational pension law in
the 1970s.159 In Germany, employers were allowed to revoke pension
promises due to financial distress until the enactment of the Act on
Better Occupational Pensions in 1974; even later on, there was still
limited scope to do this.160 In the United States, the insolvency of car
manufacturer Studebaker gave rise to ERISA in response to employees
and retirees losing all their pension claims.161 Employers in the United
States responded by switching pension promises from defined benefit to
defined contribution, thereby shifting the asset management and
longevity risks to the employees.162 In Germany, employers reduced
pension promises in general; the increase in pension promises since
2001 is due to the right of employees to convert up to 4% of their
income into occupational pensions.163
C. THE RISE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
1. The Rise of Institutional Investors in the United States and in the
United Kingdom
The National Bureau of Statistics has closely documented the rise
of institutional investors in the United Kingdom. In the 1970s and 80s,
British institutional investors already held the majority of UK equity.164
This was also due to Maynard Keynes, who advocated investments in

158. For automatic enrollment as a tool to counteract this trend resulting in short
investment horizons, see infra Part IV.A.2.
159. On the effect of ERISA on occupational pension practice, see MCGILL ET AL.,
supra note 126, at 436.
160. ROTH, PRIVATE ALTERSVORSORGE 2009, supra note 123, at 569.
161. MCGILL ET AL., supra note 126, at 424–25.
162. For a view critical of the risk shift, see JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK
SHIFT: THE NEW ECONOMIC INSECURITY AND THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM
(2006).
163. Occupational Pensions Act, Dec. 19, 1974, BGBL. I at 3610, § 1a (Ger.).
164. OFFICE FOR NAT’L STATISTICS, STATISTICAL BULLETIN, OWNERSHIP OF UK
QUOTED SHARES, 2010 (2012) (U.K.).
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equity while serving as an advisor to British insurers.165 While British
life insurance companies have invested heavily in equity, such
investments are rare internationally and in most countries, restricted by
supervisory agencies.166 In the United States, reported percentages of
equity held by institutional investors differ substantially. Gordon asserts
that institutional investors already held the majority of US shares in the
1980s,167 while Cheffins says that this occurred at least in the 1990s,168
and Armour and Skeel date this to the 2000s.169 The Conference Board
provides related data, claiming that institutional shareholding has
declined in the new millennium.170 Data from the US Census Bureau for
2010 report households and foreigners holding about 50% of US equity,
slightly more than the combined figures of pension funds, life insurance
companies, mutual funds and ETFs.171
The rise of institutional shareholders was legally embedded in
generously sponsored, funded occupational and individual pension
regimes. As previously discussed, US occupational pension law
literature hints at the irony that it was auto giant General Motors that
pressed for generous occupational pensions to prevent the rise of
‘socialism’ by granting sufficient state pensions to the middle class. In
the 1970s, the iconic Peter Drucker commented on this in his book, The

165. John
Maynard
Keynes,
Kapitalanlagepolitik
der
Lebensversicherungsgesellschaften nach englischer Auffassung, 27 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
DIE GESAMTE VERSICHERUNGSWISSENSCHAFT [ZVersWiss] 32, 39 (1927) (Ger.).
166. For Germany, see ROTH, PRIVATE ALTERSVORVORGE 2009, supra note 123, at
298–300.
167. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States,
1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465,
1567 (2007).
168. Brian R. Cheffins, The History of Corporate Governance 11 (ECGI, Working
Paper No. 184, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1975404.
169. John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile
Takeovers, and Why?—The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover
Regulation, 95 GEO. L.J. 1727, 1768 fig.1 (2007).
170. See THE CONFERENCE BOARD, supra note 131, at 25–26; Gelter, supra note
131, at 33.
171. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE 2012 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 746 tbl. 1201 (2012)
(providing the following statistics for equity holdings and net purchases, by investor
type, in the year 2010 (all in billions of dollars): Total: 23,293, Household sector:
8,514; Rest of the world: 3,091; Life insurance companies: 1,423; Private pension
funds: 1,983; State and local government retirement funds: 1,779; Mutual funds: 4,801;
Exchange-traded funds: 854).
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Unseen Revolution: How Pension Fund Socialism Came to America.172
In the 1980s, Robert Clark promoted the idea of four stages of
capitalism, beginning with the separation of ownership and management
and continuing with institutional investors telling the people how much
money they need to save.173 In 2008, GM went bankrupt largely due to
its underfunded pension plan. For airlines in the United States, filing
Chapter 11 has been a business model for much of the twenty-first
century.174
In the United States, the value of pension assets is about the same
as GDP.175 In the 1970s, US trust law was re-designed according to the
portfolio theory,176 and in the 1980s, states began to allow their pension
funds to invest a higher ratio in equity.177 The United Kingdom
followed suit; supervisory authorities traditionally allow life insurance
companies to invest substantial parts of their assets in equity.178 In
other countries, such as the United States and Germany, supervisory
authorities limit investments in equities to contracts with guarantees.179
2. Institutional Investors and Foreign Shareholdings
Following the rise of institutional investors, foreign stock
ownership rose considerably. According to data from the advisory firm
Towers Watson, US occupational pension assets are worth $16 trillion
in total,180 with equity holdings of 44% and about $7 trillion invested in

172.
173.

DRUCKER, supra note 5.
Robert C. Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment
Management Treatises, 94 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1981).
174. See Jonathan E. Collins, Airlines Jettison their Pension Plans: Congress Must
Act to Save the PBGC and Protect Plan Beneficiaries, 70 J. AIR L. & COM. 289, 303–
04 (2005).
175. TOWERS WATSON, supra note 2, at 7 (Pension assets equal 107% of GDP).
176. See generally Harvey E. Bines, Modern Portfolio Theory and Investment
Management Law: Refinement of Legal Doctrine 76 COLUM. L. REV. 721 (1976); John
H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Market Funds and Trust-Investment Law 1 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 1, 18 (1976); BEVIS LONGSTRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
AND THE PRUDENT MAN RULE (Statement of Advisers page) (1987); John H. Langbein,
The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV.
641, 662 (1996).
177. Gelter, supra note 131, at 36–37.
178. Keynes, supra note 165.
179. ROTH, PRIVATE ALTERSVORSORGE 2009, supra note 123, at 464–65, 467.
180. TOWERS WATSON, supra note 2, at 7 ($16.851 trillion).
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stock.181 It is estimated that about one-fourth of all equity is invested
abroad, accounting for about the same as, or perhaps even exceeding,
the market capitalization of all German equities.182 According to the
US Department of Treasury, US portfolio holdings of foreign securities
account for 13% of market capitalization of the German stock market,
with comparable or even higher figures for other industrial countries:
18% in Canada, 12% in France, 11% in Japan, 17% in the Netherlands,
11% in South Korea, 26% in Switzerland, and 19% in the UK.183 In the
case of Germany, the total US equity investments nearly tripled from the
end of 2001 to the end of 2009, increasing from about $70 billion184 to
about $200 billion.185
During this time, the German market
capitalization shrank by nearly 20%.186
3. Occupational Pensions and Foreign Shareholdings in Germany
In contrast to the United States, German pension assets account for
only $498 billion,187 significantly less than half of the total market
capitalization of German equity. About €170 billion of occupational
pension assets are invested in DAX 30-companies, which invest about
20% in equity.188 Since other pension institutions are even more
reluctant to invest in equity,189 10% of all occupational pension assets
invested in equity is likely to be a good guess, totaling about $50 billion.

181.
182.

Id. at 8 (52% in equity).
Id. at 7, 31–32 (about 25% of total equity in foreign stock, 52% of pension
assets in equity, amounting to one-eighth of $16.851 trillion); DEUTSCHE BÖRSE, CASH
MARKET MONTHLY STATISTICS: DECEMBER 2011, at 41 (2012) (indicating a total
market capitalization of German equity worth €912 billion).
183. PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS REPORT, supra note 30, at 12.
184. PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS REPORT, supra note 30, at 78 tbl.23 ($72.2 billion).
185. Id. at 39 tbl. A3 ($193 billion).
186. DEUTSCHE BÖRSE, supra note 182, at 41 (from €1,203,681 million to
€1,065,713 million).
187. TOWERS WATSON, supra note 2, at 7.
188. ALFRED GOHDES & DR. THOMAS JASPER, TOWERS WATSON, DAXPENSIONSWERTE 2011, at 13 (2012) (Ger.) (22% in equity).
189. For insurance companies, there are strict limits for equity investments. See
ROTH, PRIVATE ALTERSVORSORGE 2009, supra note 123, at 298 –301, 464–75.
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Even if all of this equity was German stock, this would not amount to
more than 5% of the total market capitalization of German equity.190
Due to the internationalization of equity investment in Germany, it
is likely that US pension funds invested in Germany doubles or triples
the amount of domestic pension money.191 Considering UK and other
pension money as well, foreign pension funds invested in German
equity might be five times higher than domestic pension funds in
Germany, and perhaps even up to ten times higher.192 It is also for this
reason that domestic institutional investors play a minor role in
Germany, and foreign institutional investors are assumed to hold the
majority of shares in most German blue chips (DAX 30-companies).193
According to data from Deutsche Bundesbank, considerably more than
40% of shares, in terms of market value, are in the hands of foreign
investors.194 Such ratios are also reported for other European countries
such as the United Kingdom, France and Belgium,195 while in the United
States less than 20% of equity is in the hands of foreign investors.196
Investor relations websites of the top fifteen German blue chips
show that according to market capitalization, most of them have no
controlling shareholder.197 Only VW, BMW and Henkel are de facto
controlled by families or the state; these families and the state have a
190. DEUTSCHE
BUNDESBANK
EUROSYSTEM,
STATISTIK
ÜBER
WERTPAPIERINVESTMENTS 28 (2012) (Ger.) (market value of domestic equity equaling
€1,105,140 million).
191. For U.S. holdings of German securities, see PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS REPORT,
supra note 30, at 12. For pension asset allocation in domestic equity versus total equity
exposure, see TOWERS WATSON, supra note 2, at 32.
192. TOWERS WATSON, supra note 2, at 13; DEUTSCHE BÖRSE, supra note 182, at
40.
193. ERNST & YOUNG, Wem gehört der DAX? Analyse der Aktionärsstruktur der
DAX-Unternehmen (April 26, 2012) (54% of detectible equity owners) (on file with
author).
194. DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK EUROSYSTEM, supra note 190, at 28 (market value of
domestic equity: €1,105,140 million; foreign investors: €521,006 million). A lower
ratio of about 20%, in 2007, is provided by the Federation of European Stock
Exchanges (FESE). See FED’N OF EUROPEAN SEC. EXCHS. (FESE), SHARE OWNERSHIP
STRUCTURE IN EUROPE 13 fig.2 (2008) (21.3%). See also ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV. (OECD), THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN PROMOTING
GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 120, 114–15 (2011) (finding nearly 30% foreign
ownership in 2007).
195. FED’N OF EUROPEAN SEC. EXCHS., supra note 194, at 12.
196. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 171, at 746 tbl. 1201 (about 15%).
197. See DAX Marktkapitalisierung, FINANZEN.NET, http://www.finanzen.net/index/
DAX/Marktkapitalisierung.
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significant role in VW, with the Porsche and Piech family controlling
the Porsche holding of 51% of VW, the German state Lower Saxony
holding another 20%, and Quatar holding 17% (these percentages refer
to voting shares; VW is in the DAX with preference shares giving no
voting rights).198 The other companies have no German investor holding
more than 10%. Of the twelve companies whose shares are in free float
(out of fifteen with the biggest market capitalization), virtually all of
them are in foreign hands, meaning a majority of foreign shareholdings.
Only Deutsche Bank is regularly switching from domestic to foreign
shareholder majority.199 In the case of BASF, foreign majority is likely
but not entirely clear.200 These two exceptions among the companies in
free float may also serve as examples of a long-term shareholder basis
through generous employee participation in company stock.201
D. PENSION FUNDS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
1. The Influence of Institutional Shareholders on US and UK Corporate
Governance
The term corporate governance came into vogue, or at least was
established, in the United States.202 Corporate governance began to
emerge with the inspections of companies reporting on bribes of foreign
officials, resulting in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act203 and later the

198. See Shareholder Structure, VOLKSWAGEN AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT (Dec. 31,
2013), http://www.volkswagenag.com/content/vwcorp/content/en/investor_relations/
share/Shareholder_Structure.html.
199. Shareholder
Structure,
DEUTSCHE
BANK
(Dec.
31,
2012),
https://www.deutsche-bank.de/ir/en/content/shareholder_structure.htm.
200. Shareholder Structure, BASF (Dec. 31, 2012), http://www.basf.com/group/
corporate/en/investor-relations/share/shareholder-structure
201. For using ESOPs as a takeover defense in the US, see Hansmann, supra note
151, at 1797.
202. See Cheffins, supra note 168, at 2 (observing that the term “corporate
governance” came into vogue in one single country: the United States).
203. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1—78dd-3). Reporting on this and on the
Co-Determination Act of 1976, see Herbert Wiedemann, Die Zukunft des
Gesellschaftsrechts, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR ROBERT FISCHER 883 (Marcus Lutter, Walter
Stimpel & Herbert Wiedemann eds., 1979) (Ger.).
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OECD Convention on Combating Bribery.204 In academia, the work of
Eisenberg was influential in this area.205 In practice, an association of
state pension funds promoted corporate governance, with CalPERS the
largest by assets, and CII. CII calls itself the ‘voice of corporate
governance’ and stated that it championed the independent director
paradigm which was later adopted.206 The National Association of
Pension Funds (NAPF) has been of similar, if not greater, importance in
the United Kingdom. In preparing a collection of essays,207 the Cadbury
Report, they serve as a good starting point of the European corporate
governance debate. When the Cadbury Report was issued, UK
institutional investors, such as pension funds and insurance companies,
held over half of the equity of UK listed companies.208
2. The European Code of Conduct Movement
In the United States, corporate governance standards are mandatory
in the listing rules209 and are not restricted to a comply-or-explain basis
as in Europe. This more liberal regulatory approach was developed in
the United Kingdom, where the European corporate governance debate
204. See generally THE OECD CONVENTION ON BRIBERY: A COMMENTARY ON THE
CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS OF 21 NOVEMBER 1997, (Marc Pieth et al.
eds., 2007); see also Markus Roth, Die OECD-Empfehlung im Gesamtzusammenhang
der Verhinderung von Bestechung, 56 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT
[RIW] 737 (2010).
205. See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL
ANALYSIS (1976).
206. COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (CII), http://www.cii.org/about_us (last
visited Jan. 20, 2013). Former version (http://www.cii.org/about/who_we_serve.)
accessible via the webarchive, stated under the headline ‘Improving Corporate
Governance’:
Many of the Council’s corporate governance policies, once considered radical, are
now in the mainstream. Principles that we championed over time—from director
independence to clear links between executive pay and company performance—have
been adopted by U.S. companies; enshrined in regulation, legislation and stock
exchange listing standards; and emulated abroad.
207. NAT’L ASS’N OF PENSION FUNDS, CREATIVE TENSION? NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF PENSION FUNDS

(1990).
For the development of share ownership in the United Kingdom, see Armour &
Skeel, supra note 169, at 1768–70.
209. See, e.g., Listed Company Manual § 303A.00 Corporate Governance Standards
NYSE (2013), http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?
selectednode=chp_1_4_3&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm-sections%2F (listing
the Corporate Governance rules of NYSE-listed companies).
208.
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began.210 Consistent with the regulatory philosophy of the City Code on
Takeovers,211 the Cadbury Report and the Combined Code, now the UK
Corporate Governance Code, used the comply-or-explain principle.
This tenet operated as the role model for the European Union, which
introduced the comply-or-explain principle in the Fourth Council
Directive in 2006.212 Codes of conduct are better suited to more diverse
companies according to shareholder structure, especially to companies
with significant shareholders, and to co-determination and companies in
countries with extensive regulation in stock corporation acts, such as
Germany.213 In Germany, the comply-or-explain principle has been part
of the German Stock Corporation Act since 2002.214 Initially only for
listed companies, the Act now also applies to other capital marketoriented companies as well.215
E. THEORY OF THE FIRM
1. The Shareholder Value Puzzle
From a continental European perspective, one of the corporate
governance puzzles that US academia and practice almost universally
accept is that while the firm is a nexus of contracts,216 shareholder
primacy sets the standard for corporate action.217 In terms of
shareholder power vis-à-vis management, however, such shareholder
primacy was in part implemented only after the financial crisis by the
Dodd-Frank Act.218 In Germany it is accepted that management may
also take into account interests of other stakeholders, such as
210. See Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art
and International Regulation, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 11–14 (2011).
211. For the UK Takeover Code, see Armour & Skeel, supra note 169, at 1727–30.
212. European Parliament and Council Directive 2006/46, art. 1, no. 7, 2006 O.J. (L
224) 4 (EC) (amending Council Directive 78/660/EEC on the annual accounts of
certain types of companies).
213. See Hopt, supra note 210, at 12.
214. Stock Corporation Act, Sept. 6, 1965, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] I at 1089,
§ 161, as amended, Dec. 2012 (Ger.).
215. Id.
216. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976).
217. See ALFRED RAPPAPORT, CREATING SHAREHOLDER VALUE: A GUIDE FOR
MANAGERS AND INVESTORS (1998).
218. See infra Part III.A.2.
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employees;219 in contrast to the US, some go so far as to say that the
enterprise is more than the company as a legal form; it also consists of
the interests of the employees and other stakeholders.220
2. Pensions Bridging the Rift Between Shareholder Value and the
Stakeholder Approach
The rift between the shareholder and the stakeholder approach may
be bridged by focusing on long-termism as an appropriate overarching
corporate governance principle in times of pension capitalism.221
Mirroring their own interests in a long-term increase in corporate value,
private pension institutions place emphasis on sustainable corporate
growth. Under the Corporate Governance Principles of Hermes, the
primary goal is managing companies and establishing value in the longterm interest of shareholders.222 The doctrines championed by CalPERS
are based on the conviction that the structures set up by their principles
will deliver the best long-term results for shareholders.223 The Corporate
Governance Principles of Hermes assume that independent directors are
most likely to make decisions in the interests of all long-term
shareholders.224 This focus on the long-term interests of shareholders
ensures that shareholder interests are taken into account, as a company
can only be successful in the long run if it has sufficient regard for the
interests of customers, suppliers, and employees.225

219. For a long-term focus on plurality of interests, see Michael Kort, in
AKTIENGESETZ: GROßKOMMENTAR § 76, no. 52 ff (Klaus J. Hopt & Herbert Wiedemann
eds., 4th ed. 2002); leaning towards this view now, Peter O. Mülbert, Soziale
Verantwortung von Unternehmen im Gesellschaftsrecht, 2009 AG 766, 774.
220. On this discussion, see Roth, Employee Participation, supra note 4, at 65.
221. See infra Part IV.
222. HERMES PENSIONS MGMT. LTD., THE HERMES PRINCIPLES (2002); HERMES INV.
MGMT., INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 1 (1999) [hereinafter
HERMES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES]; HERMES INV. MGMT. LTD., THE
HERMES RESPONSIBLE OWNERSHIP PRINCIPLES (2013) [hereinafter HERMES
RESPONSIBLE OWNERSHIP PRINCIPLES].
223. THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM (CALPERS),
GLOBAL PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTABLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 7, § III.A. (last
updated Nov. 14, 2011) [hereinafter CALPERS, GLOBAL PRINCIPLES].
224. HERMES RESPONSIBLE OWNERSHIP PRINCIPLES, supra note 222, § XI (the ability
for boards to “act objectively and independently in the long-term interest of the
company and its shareholders”).
225. Roth, Private Altersvorsorge 2011, supra note 1, at 540.
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By focusing on long-term shareholder value, the enlightened
shareholder value approach is appropriately implemented.226 This idea
largely levels the classical conflict between the shareholder and
stakeholder approaches. In the long term, shareholder value should only
be created if the company also promotes the interests of employees,
clients, suppliers, and the public.227 However, such a long term focus
might be better implemented by also choosing a design which
implements a more diverse view by giving human capital a “say” in
corporate governance.228 Referring to corporate governance principles
established in the United States, the independent directors provided for
in the Investment Act of 1940 had a significant impact some fifty years
later on the governance of “normal” firms.229 The representation of
workers in United States pension funds, as required by some state
laws—e.g., California’s CalPERS—might play a similar role in the
future.
In Germany, there is a long doctrinal tradition of including
stakeholder interests in the company enterprise.230 The German
Corporate Governance Code endorses this approach by reference in its
preamble to the interest of the enterprise. The Code “clarifies” the
obligation of the management and supervisory boards to ensure the
continued existence of the enterprise, as well as its sustainable creation
of value in conformity with the principles of the social market
economy.231 According to the German Code, the management board is
responsible for independently managing the enterprise in its own best
interest,232 thus taking into account the interests of shareholders,
employees, and other stakeholders, with the objective of sustainable

226. Without such long-term focus, see, e.g., Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 172
(Eng.).
227. For a US perspective, see Hansmann, supra note 151, at 1816 (expressing the
view that companies run for employees often perform better).
228. For German co-determination regimes, see supra Part I.A.2.
229. See infra Part II.A.1.
230. See WALTHER RATHENAU, VOM AKTIENWESEN: EINE GESCHÄFTLICHE
BETRACHTUNG 62 (1917).
231. See GOV’T COMM’N, DEUTSCHER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE KODEX [DCGK]
[GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE] Foreword (2012), translation available at
http://www.corporate-governance-code.de/eng/download/kodex_2012/D_CorGov_
final_May_2012.pdf.
232. See id. § 4.1.1.
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creation of value. Works councils, as company institutions within the
company, are especially relevant in large companies.
The long-term shareholder value approach is aligned with the
classical
German
approach
of
corporate
interest
233
(Unternehmensinteresse).
According to Gerhard Spindler, § 70 AktG
of 1937 cannot be classified solely as a National Socialist provision.234
Rather, the provision can also be based on the theory of the corporation
(Theorie des Unternehmens); F.A. Mann has emphasized the influence
of the teachings of the corporation (des Unternehmens) (§ 70 AktG) as
such.235 Even the Government Draft Bill of 1930 explicitly recognized
the principle that the “corporate interest as such is equally worthy of
protection as interests of individual shareholders” (“dass die Interessen
des Unternehmens als solches ebenso schutzbedürftig sind wie das
individuelle Interesse des Aktionärs”), and concluded that if the
company is managed properly and individual shareholders have an
appropriate attitude, the interests of the company and shareholders
should converge.236
3. The European Company
About half of all operating European companies, and an even larger
share of co-determined European companies, are of German origin;237 a
partial explanation for this increasing number of European companies in

233. See ARNDT RIECHERS, DAS “UNTERNEHMEN AN SICH”: DIE ENTWICKLUNG EINES
BEGRIFFS IN DER AKTIENRECHTSDISKUSSION DES 20. JAHRHUNDERTS (1996).
234. GERALD SPINDLER, HANS-BÖCKLER STIFTUNG, UNTERNEHMENSINTERESSE ALS
LEITLINIE
DES
VORSTANDSHANDELNS
–
BERÜCKSICHTIGUNG
VON
ARBEITNEHMERINTERESSEN UND SHAREHOLDER VALUE [COMPANIES INTERESTS AS A
GUIDELINE OF BOARD ACTION - CONSIDERATION OF EMPLOYEE INTERESTS AND
SHAREHOLDER VALUE] 4 (2008).
235. Frederick A. Mann, The New German Company Law and Its Background, 19 J.
COMP. LEGIS. & INT’L L. 220, 227 (1937).
236. ENTWURF
EINES
GESETZES
ÜBER
AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN
UND
KOMMANDITGESELLSCHAFTEN
AUF
AKTIEN
SOWIE
ENTWURF
EINES
EINFÜHRUNGSGESETZES NEBST ERLÄUTERNDEN BEMERKUNGEN: ERLÄUTERNDE
BEMERKUNGEN, EINLEITUNG 94 (1930).
237. According to the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI), 121 out of 244
European Companies with more than five employees are located in Germany as well as
40 out of 49 co-determined European Companies, ETUI, OVERVIEW OF CURRENT STATE
OF SE FOUNDING IN EUROPE, Update: 1 April 2013, 3, 10
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Germany is the German co-determination law.238 While in German
stock corporations only employees employed in Germany are
represented in supervisory boards, in European companies (Societas
Europaea, SE),239 employees located in other European Union countries
are also represented.240 Considering, inter alia, the demands for greater
diversity on the supervisory boards, it appears questionable how long
international pension funds will put up with the outmoded German codetermination model.241 The recommendation by the study group on codetermination (“Arbeitskreis “Unternehmerische Mitbestimmung”) to
introduce a regime similar to the SE242 has rather unsurprisingly been
rejected by the labor unions.243 International institutional investors are
also questioning the mandatory participation of labor unions.244 Against
this backdrop, Hermes is encouraging companies to consider a
conversion to an SE.245 A striking observation in practical terms is that
238. See Horst Eidenmüller et al., Incorporating under European Law: The Societas
Europaea as a Vehicle for Legal Arbitrage, 10 EUROPEAN BUSINESS ORGANIZATION
LAW REVIEW [EBOR] 1, 32 (2009) (U.K.).
239. See ERNST & YOUNG, STUDY ON THE OPERATION AND THE IMPACTS OF THE
STATUTE FOR A EUROPEAN COMPANY (SE): FINAL REPORT 246 (2009) [hereinafter 2009
ERNST & YOUNG STUDY] (explicitly labeling this as an advantage of the SE). On
December 31, 2008, more than half of all SEs were incorporated/domiciled in Germany
(45 of 73). See Berndt Keller & Frank Werner, Arbeitnehmerbeteiligung in der
Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft (SE) – Empirische Befunde und (un-)erwartete
Konsequenzen, 62 WSI MITTEILUNGEN 416, 419 tbl.2 (2009).
240. See Council Directive 2001/86 of 8 October 2001 Supplementing the Statute
for a European Company with Regard to the Involvement of Employees, 2001 O.J. (L
294) 22 (EC).
241. See Rüdiger von Rosen, Kapitalmarkt und Mitbestimmung, in STEFAN
GRUNDMANN ET AL., UNTERNEHMENSRECHT ZU BEGINN DES 21. JAHRHUNDERTS:
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR EBERHARD SCHWARK ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 789, 799 (Christine
Windbichler et al. eds., 2009) (maintaining the continued need for reform).
242. Arbeitskreis ‘Unternehmerische Mitbestimmung,’ Entwurf einer Regelung zur
Mitbestimmungsvereinbarung sowie zur Größe des mitbestimmten Aufsichtsrats, 30
ZIP 885 (2009).
243. For an unambiguous account, see the contribution by Hexel in the roundtable
discussion, 30 ZIP (Beilage zu Heft 48) 35, 36 (2009).
244. Thomas von Oehsen, Die Rolle von ISS im Kapitalmarkt und Perspektiven
guter Corporate Governance, in 65. DEUTSCHER BETRIEBSWIRTSCHAFTER-TAG 2011,
45 (2012).
245. HERMES EQUITY OWNERSHIP SERVS., HERMES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
PRINCIPLES – GERMANY (2011). On the construction of the co-determination regime of
the SE in Germany, Austria, Sweden and France, see Claudia Schubert, The National
Implementation of Employee Participation in the Administrative Board of the SE in the
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all German co-determined SEs have so far chosen a dualistic board.246
This should change, however, if the proposal by Ernst & Young is
adopted, under the terms of which the SE statute would explicitly limit
equal co-determination to non-executive directors.247
II. INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR PARADIGM AND BOARD COMMITTEES
A. INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN THE US, EUROPE AND ASIA
1. The Rise of Independent Boards
Institutional investors, particularly pension funds, place great value
on independent supervisory boards or board members.248 On its website,
the CII demands at least two-thirds of board members to be
independent.249 In the early 1990s, the Cadbury Report provided for
more than half of the non-executive board to be independent.250 The
Combined Code has now extended this quota to the entire board; smaller
companies should have at least two independent directors.251 The
Principles of Corporate Governance of the Hermes pension fund deal
with the ideal proportion of independent directors at the country level: in
One-tier Model – A Legal Comparison on the Basis of Germany, Austria, Sweden, and
France, 5 EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV. [ECFR] 422 (2008).
246. See Roth, Employee Participation, supra note 4, at 83. An exception to this is
PUMA (a listed company with a foreign majority shareholder), which has converted to
a monistic board system.
247. See 2009 ERNST & YOUNG STUDY, supra note 239, at 285 (discussing Art. 43 of
SE Regulation).
248. See Joseph A. McCahery et al., Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance
Preferences of Institutional Investors 51–52 tbl. IV, V (AFA 2011 Denver Meetings
Paper, Tilburg Law School Research Paper No. 10, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1571046.
249. See COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
POLICIES § 2.3, available at http://www.cii.org/corp_gov_policies (last updated Oct. 5,
2012).
250. See Report of the Committee on The Financial Aspects of Corporate
Governance (Cadbury Report), reprinted in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,
ESSAYS AND MATERIALS, Annex I/1 § 2.2 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds.,
1997); see also John C. Shaw, The Cadbury Report, Two Years Later, in COMPARATIVE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, ESSAYS AND MATERIALS, at 41.
251. See FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE COMBINED CODE ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE § A.3.2 (2010) (U.K.), available at http://www.frc.org.uk/OurWork/Publications/Corporate-Governance/The-Combined-Code-on-CorporateGoverance.aspx.
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the US, a simple majority; in Brazil, at least one-third must be
independent.252 In its Guide for Superannuation Trustees, the Australian
Council of Superinvestors (“ACSI”) requires a majority of the board to
be independent.253 Yet, there is no evidence on whether independent
boards generate greater value.254
For the United States, CII corporate governance principles require
that at least two-thirds of the board members be independent.255 This
exceeds considerably the listing rules of NYSE and NASDAQ, which
require only a majority-independent board,256 and has contributed to the
fact that in the United States more than 80% of directors are
independent.257 In fact, the United States probably has the highest ratio
of independent directors in the world.258 Another explanation for this
might be its relatively lenient standards for independence. In contrast to
the European Union, the US’s list of requirements for independence is
relatively short and more lenient; for example, significant shareholders
and their representatives are considered to be independent.259 Even if
the US is not famous for concentrated ownership, this might have an
effect since founder-directors in tech firms can be treated as independent
even with voting shares of 10% or higher.

252. See, e.g., HERMES EQUITY OWNERSHIP SERVS., HERMES CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES – UNITED STATES (2012); HERMES EQUITY OWNERSHIP
SERVS., HERMES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES – BRAZIL (2012).
253. See AUSTRALIAN COUNCIL OF SUPER INVESTORS (ACSI), A GUIDE FOR
SUPERANNUATION TRUSTEES TO MONITOR LISTED AUSTRALIAN COMPANIES (ACSI
GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES: MAY 2009) § 5(d) (2009).
254. Luca Enriques, Reinier Kraakman & Henry B. Hansmann, The Basic
Governance Structure: The Interests of Shareholders as a Class, in ANATOMY OF
CORPORATE LAW 56, 66 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2008); Sanjai Bhagat &
Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and Long-Term
Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 263 (2002); see also the overview by Gordon,
supra note 167, at 1500–09.
255. COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, supra note 249, § 2.3.
256. See NASDAQ OMX Group, Inc., NASDAQ STOCK MARKET RULES §
5605(b)(1); NYSE EURONEXT, NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.01.
257. SPENCER STUART US BOARD INDEX 2011, at 8 (2011) (84%).
258. For the United States, see id. For Europe, see HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES,
EUROPEAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REPORT 2011: CHALLENGING BOARD
PERFORMANCE 42 fig.35 (2011). With better data, see Enriques et al., supra note 254, at
56, 70.
259. NASDAQ, supra note 256, § 5605(a)(2) (defining “independence”).
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According to a European survey by Heidrick & Struggles, fewer
independent directors are found in Europe.260 In the Netherlands, 75%
of all supervisory board members are independent, as well as 72% in
Finland; 62% in Switzerland; 61% in the United Kingdom; 51% in
Norway; and 48% in Italy.261 Countries below the European average of
43% independent directors are, inter alia, France and Sweden (40%),
Austria (36%), Spain (33%), Belgium (32%), Denmark (30%), and
finally Germany (21%), which has lowest ratio of independent directors
in the survey.262 In most European countries, independence standards
are stricter than in the United States.263 For example, according to the
European Recommendation on independence, a significant shareholder
and his legal representatives are not independent.264 In the United States
and Switzerland, even majority shareholders traditionally pass as
independent, although some companies refrain from declaring them as
such. For a long time, Germany was reluctant to follow the European
Union proposal,265 but recently the Government Commission on
Corporate Governance changed the German Corporate Governance
Code to exclude majority shareholders from being independent.266
In Asia, independent directors are increasingly incorporated into
national corporate governance regimes. By 2001, China had already
incorporated independent directors into its unique corporate governance
structure, with a board of directors that is overseen by a supervisory
board.267 Chinese listing regulations require that a third of the board of

260.
261.
262.
263.

HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, supra note 258.
Id. at 42.
Id.
For the United States, see NASDAQ OMX Group, Inc., NASDAQ STOCK
MARKET RULES § 5605(a)(2); NYSE EURONEXT, NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL §
303A.02. Calling for stricter independence standards in the US Hermes Equity
Ownership Services, Hermes Corporate Governance Principles United States,
Independence: companies should go beyond the definitions of independence according
to the NASDAQ and NYSE. The new NYSE rules effective from July 1, 2013 does not
reflect this.
264. Commission Recommendation 2005/162 of 15 Feb. 2005 on the Role of Nonexecutive or Supervisory Directors of Listed Companies and on the Committees of the
(Supervisory) Board, Annex II, 2005 O.J. (L 52) 51, 63 (EC) [hereinafter
Recommendation No. 2005/162].
265. See infra Part II.C.
266. GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE § 5.4.2 (2012).
267. See Donald C. Clarke, The Independent Director in Chinese Corporate
Governance, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 125, 173–74 (2006).
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directors be independent.268 For South Korea, there is evidence that the
existence of independent directors correlates with firm performance;269
South Korea first required outside directors after the Asian crisis.270
Since the definition of an outside director in the Korean Securities and
Exchange Act excludes, inter alia, significant shareholders,271 at least
half of the board has to be independent in large corporations.272 In
Japan, the Tokyo Stock Exchange requires the appointment of one
independent director;273 major shareholders are deemed not to be
independent,274 and the number of independent directors correlates with
foreign investments. While companies with a shareholding ratio below
10% appointed 1.51 independent directors on average, companies with a
foreign shareholder ratio of at least 30% have appointed an average of
2.93 independent directors.275

268. Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of
Listed Companies - 2001 (promulgated by China Securities Regulatory Comm’n., Aug.
16, 2001) Zhengjianfa [2001] No. 102, Art. I.3 (China), available at
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/newsfacts/release/200708/t20070810_69191.htm.
269. Jongmoo Jay Choi et al., The Value of Outside Directors: Evidence from
Corporate Governance Reform in Korea, 42 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 941
(2007); Bernard S. Black et al., How Corporate Governance Affects Firm Value:
Evidence on Channels from Korea 27 (University of Texas School of Law, Law and
Economics Working Paper No. 51, 2008), available at http:// ssrn.com/abstract=
844744.
270. Bernard Black, Corporate Governance in Korea at the Millennium: Enhancing
International Competitiveness (Final Report and Legal Reform Recommendations to
the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Korea), 26 J. CORP. L. 537, 554 (2001).
271. Korean Securities and Exchange Act, Act No. 972, Jan. 15, 1962, art. 54-5(4),
amended by Act No. 6695, Apr. 27, 2002, available at http://unpan1.un.org/
intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan011491.pdf.
272. In terms of comparative Corporate Governance, this is a rather strict standard.
For Switzerland, see ECONOMIESUISSE, SWISS CODE OF BEST PRACTICE FOR CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE II.b.12, g.22 (2007). For the United States, see NASDAQ, supra note
256, § 5605(a)(2), (b)(1).
273. TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., ENFORCEMENT RULES FOR SECURITIES LISTING
REGULATIONS, Rule 436-2 (2012).
274. Id. at Rule 211(5)a.(d).
275. TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE INC., WHITE PAPER ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
2011, 42 (2011).
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2. Independent Chairpersons and Committees
Pension funds worldwide recommend an independent chairperson
of the board,276 as in the UK Corporate Governance Code277 and the
ACSI Governance Guidelines.278 Similarly, the Dodd-Frank Act
requires the SEC to pass appropriate rules.279 Under the UK Corporate
Governance Code, director independence is one of four criteria required
for an appointment to the board,280 maintaining the requirement that at
least half of the board members be independent.281 The Green Paper of
the European Commission follows suit by including independence as a
factor in selecting boards.282 Internationally, independence of the
majority of members is not required or practiced for all control organs,
as is shown by the common global practice of employees sitting on codetermined boards, or at any rate on the (supervisory) boards of
occupational pension institutions.
A controversial point is the
benchmark for determining independence.283
According to the
recommendation of the EU on the independence of supervisory boards
and board members, even the representatives of major shareholders are

276. See, e.g., CALPERS, GLOBAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 223, at III.B.,
Recommended Rule 1.4; HERMES EQUITY OWNERSHIP SERVICES, LTD., HERMES
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES – UNITED STATES 2 (2012) (identifying combined
Chair/CEO Roles, expectation to split roles); MILLSTEIN CENTER FOR CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE, YALE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT, POLICY BRIEFING
NO. 4: CHAIRING THE BOARD: THE CASE FOR INDEPENDENT LEADERSHIP IN CORPORATE
NORTH AMERICA 21 (2009) (recommending independent chairmanship as the default
model).
277. Upon appointment, the chairperson should be independent. FIN. REPORTING
COUNCIL, U.K. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE § A.2.1 (2012) (U.K.), available at
http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/UK-CorporateGovernance-Code-September-2012.aspx.
278. ACSI GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES, supra note 253, § 9.2.
279. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 972, 124 Stat. 1376, 1915 (2010).
280. UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE § B.1 (“The board and its committees
should have the appropriate balance of skills, experience, independence and knowledge
of the company to enable them to discharge their respective duties and responsibilities
effectively.”).
281. Id. § B.1.2.
282. The Green Paper’s criteria for the selection of board members include: “merit,
professional qualifications, experience, the personal qualities of the candidate,
independence and diversity.” Green Paper, supra note 24, at 5, § 1.1.
283. Enriques et al., supra note 254, at 64.
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not considered to be independent.284
Furthermore, and quite
appropriately, employee representatives are not regarded as
independent;285 the rights to appoint board members are viewed
critically.286
According to the listing requirement of the NYSE and NASDAQ,
audit committees, nomination committees and remuneration committees
in the United States have to be fully independent; due to this rule’s
mandatory nature, companies comply.287
The UK Corporate
Governance Code does not require full independence for all of these
committees.288 The EU’s recommendation on independent directors
requires only a majority of the audit committee, the remuneration
committee and the nomination committee to be independent.289 Quotas
in many European countries are lower than this; according to a study by
Heidrick & Struggles, Germany has the lowest quota among European
blue chips.290
In Germany, the nomination committee is restricted to the
nomination of supervisory directors.291 This allows a co-determination-

284.
285.

Recommendation No. 2005/162, supra note 264, at 63.
See Klaus J. Hopt & Markus Roth, § 100, in AKTIENGESETZ:
GROßKOMMENTAR, supra note 35, arguing this point originally, and more recently in
Christine Windbichler, Die Rolle von Amtsträgern der Betriebsverfassung im
Aufsichtsrat, in GRUNDMANN ET AL., UNTERNEHMENSRECHT ZU BEGINN DES 21.
JAHRHUNDERTS, supra note 241, at 805. For a view raising doubts on this position, see
Michael Kort, Standardization of Company Law in Germany, Other EU Member States
and Turkey by Corporate Governance Rules, 5 ECFR 379, 404 (2008); Michael Kort,
Interessenkonflikte bei Organmitgliedern der AG, 29 ZIP 717, 725 (2008).
286. For example, on the VW decision by the ECJ, see Gert-Jan Vossestein,
Volkswagen: The State of Affairs of Golden Shares, General Company Law and
European Free Movement of Capital, 5 ECFR 115, 125 (2008).
287. SPENCER STUART, supra note 257, at 9 (stating that only thirteen controlled
companies do not have a fully independent nomination committee).
288. According to the UK Corporate Governance Code, the nomination committee
has to be composed of a majority of independent directors. UK CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE CODE § B.2.1 (2012).
289. Recommendation No. 2005/162, supra note 264, at 58 Annex I, §§ 2.1.2
(nomination committee), 3.1.2 (remuneration committee), 60 Annex I, § 4.1 (audit
committee).
290. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, supra note 258, at 44.
291. GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE § 5.3.3 (2012).
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free composition.292 A personal or presidential committee commonly
organizes the nomination and remuneration of managing directors.293 A
remuneration committee is not specifically recommended, but is only
mentioned by the German Corporate Governance Code.294 According to
the German Stock Corporation Act, the remuneration and appointment
of managing directors are to be decided by the supervisory board as a
whole.295 Board committees in Germany are also subject to codetermination.296 In September 2012, the German Jurists Forum
recommended the introduction of quotas for the audit and remuneration
committees.297
B. INDEPENDENCE AND EXPERTISE
The issue of appropriate expertise of supervisory directors has now
come to the forefront of debate.298 In Germany, the requirements have
already been made stricter for credit institutions, insurance companies,
and pension funds.299 The draft of an act on the supervision of financial
markets and the insurance industry also included the supervisory boards
of retirement funds (Pensionskassen).300 This could, however, lead to
problems for the rather common worldwide practice of employee
representatives and retirees sitting on co-determined boards in pension
funds.301 This is one reason why the legislature has refrained from

292. According to German Stock Corporation Act § 124(3), resolutions for
proposing shareholder representatives to be elected by the general meeting may be
taken by shareholder representatives.
293. See Klaus J. Hopt & Markus Roth, § 107, in AKTIENGESETZ:
GROßKOMMENTAR, supra note 35, no. 340–47.
294. GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE § 5.1, 2.
295. German Stock Corporation Act § 107(3).
296. See Klaus J. Hopt & Markus Roth, § 107, in AKTIENGESETZ:
GROßKOMMENTAR, supra note 35, no. 277–89.
297. GERMAN JURISTS FORUM, MUNICH 2012, supra note 89, Business Law Section,
Resolution 12.d.aa-12.d.bb.
298. See Harald Hau & Marcel Thum, Subprime Crisis and Board (In-)Competence:
Private vs. Public Banks in Germany, in 60 ECONOMIC POLICY 701 (2009) (finding the
expertise of supervisory directors enhanced the performance of banks).
299. Gesetz zur Stärkung der Finanzmarkt- und Versicherungsaufsicht vom
29.7.2009, July 29, 2009, BGBL. I at 2305 (Ger.).
300. For the governmental draft, see DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: GESETZENTWURF DER
BUNDESREGIERUNG [BT] 16/12783 (Ger.).
301. See ROTH, PRIVATE ALTERSVORSORGE 2009, supra note 123, at 211.
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requiring a minimum level of expertise for supervisory board members
of retirement funds.302
C. INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN GERMANY
The term independent director is not defined in the Stock
Corporation Act.303 For the independence criterion of the “financial
expert,” introduced by the German Stock Corporation Act to transpose
the revised Auditor Directive,304 academia draws on the February 15,
2005 European Commission Recommendation regarding the role of
non-executive or supervisory directors of listed companies and
committees of the (supervisory) board.305 In contrast to the European
Recommendation and the UK Corporate Governance Code, the German
Corporate Governance Code provides a short list of criteria that indicate
a lack of independence. This short list was recently proposed by the
Governance Code Commission,306 but dropped after public
consultation.307
According to the German Corporate Governance Code of May
2012,308 a supervisory board member is considered to be independent if
he or she has no business or personal relations with the company, its
management board, a controlling shareholder or an enterprise linked to
302. Critical of this, see Andreas Hasse, Auswirkungen des Gesetzes zur Stärkung
der Finanzmarkt- und Versicherungsaufsicht auf die Corporate Governance von
Versicherungsunternehmen, 2010 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR VERSICHERUNGSRECHT, HAFTUNGSUND SCHADENSRECHT [VersR] 18, 19.
303. Mathias Habersack, “Kirch/Deutsche Bank” und die Folgen – Überlegungen zu
§ 100 Abs. 5 AktG und Ziff. 5.4, 5.5 DCGK -, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR WULF GOETTE ZUM
65. GEBURTSTAG 121, 126 (Mathias Habersack & Peter Hommelhoff eds., 2011).
304. Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBL. I at 1089,
§§ 100(5), 107(4), last amended by Restrukturierungsgesetz [RStruktG] [Restructuring
Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900 (Ger.).
305. Uwe Hüffer, Die Unabhängigkeit von Aufsichtsratsmitgliedern nach Ziffer
5.4.2 DCGK, 27 ZIP 637 (2006).
306. See GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE § 5.3.2 (2012), as amended on
May 26, 2010 with proposals from the plenary session of 17 January 2012, available at
http://www.corporate-governancecode.de/eng/download/aenderungen_2012/Kodexaenderungen_final_2012_02_01.pdf.
307. Most published statements of interested parties were critical of the list. See
primarily Deutscher Anwaltverein, Handelsrechtsausschuss, Stellungnahme zu den
Änderungsvorschlägen der Regierungskommission Deutscher Corporate Governance
Kodex vom 1.2.2012, 2012 NZG 335, 337–38.
308. GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE § 5.4.2 (2012).
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the controlling shareholder, all of which may cause a conflict of
interests. Academia is split on whether the EU Recommendation can be
used to sharpen the independence requirements in the German Code.309
Not more than two former members of the management board shall be
members of the supervisory board; members of the supervisory board
shall not hold directorships or similar positions, or perform advisory
tasks for important competitors of the company.310 In making proposals
for the election of supervisory directors to the general meeting, holdings
of 10% or more of the shares of the company must be disclosed.311
The supervisory board shall include what it considers to be an
adequate number of independent directors.312 The concrete objectives of
the supervisory board and the status of their implementation shall be
published in the Corporate Governance Report.313 For Germany, it is
appropriate to focus on shareholder representatives only; in major
companies with a diversified shareholder structure, half of the board
should be independent.314 The proxy-advisor Institutional Shareholder
Services (“ISS”) calls for one-third of the entire board to be
independent,315 leading to the independence of two-thirds of shareholder
representatives in quasi-parity co-determined boards.316 On boards with
a controlling shareholder located in countries that are in line with
modern European corporate governance standards, e.g., France,317 the
supervisory board may hold that it is “adequate” if one-third of the
shareholder representatives are independent.318 For smaller companies,
such as UK companies outside the FTSE 350,319 two independent
309. See Roth, Unabhängige Aufsichtsratsmitglieder, supra note 20, at 629–30
(assuming a clearly distinct German definition); see also Marcus Lutter, Die
Empfehlungen der Kommission vom 14. 12. 2004 und vom 15. 2. 2005 und ihre
Umsetzung in Deutschland, 20 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht [EuZW]
799, 804 (2009).
310. GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE § 5.4.2 (3).
311. Id. § 5.4.1 (4), (6).
312. Id. § 5.4.2 (1).
313. Id. § 5.4.1 (3)2.
314. See Roth, Unabhängige Aufsichtsratsmitglieder, supra note 20, at 636.
315. Institutional S’holder Servs. Inc. (ISS), 2012 EUROPEAN PROXY VOTING
SUMMARY GUIDELINES 8 (2011) [hereinafter GUIDELINES].
316. See Markus Roth, Information und Organisation des Aufsichtsrats, 2012 ZGR
343, 380.
317. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE OF LISTED CORPORATIONS § 8.2 (2008) (Fr.),
available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/afep_medef_code_dec2008_en.pdf.
318. See Roth, Unabhängige Aufsichtsratsmitglieder, supra note 20, at 636.
319. UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE § B.1.2 (2012) (U.K.).
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directors is generally sufficient. Less stringent standards are also
generally applied in Austria and Sweden, which require only up to two
independent directors. In Austria, when the free float is more than 50%,
the two supervisory directors must also be independent from the
controlling shareholder; when the free float is over 20%, only one has to
be independent.320 In Sweden, at least two members must be
independent in relation to the company’s major shareholders, regardless
of the company size.321
It is contested whether employee representatives are independent.
Unions claim that the employees sitting on the board as employee
representatives, as well as union delegates representing the employees in
the supervisory board, are independent.322 Decisions by the courts do
not make this issue clear, and most academics argue that employee
representatives are not independent.323 The EU Recommendation
regarding independent directors324 is somewhat ambiguous, suggesting
that employee representatives need not be declared non-independent.325
In a recent survey, advisor Heidrick & Struggles classifies employee
representatives as a distinct category, leading to far less than half of all
supervisory directors being considered independent in Germany.326 The
German Jurists Forum recommends taking co-determination into
account by articulating requirements for independence.327

320. AUSTRIAN CODE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § C (54) (Austria), available at
http://www.wienerborse.at/corporate/pdf/CG%20Codex%202012_v5_englisch.pdf.
321. Swedish Corporate Governance Code § 4.5 (2010) (Swed.).
322. See Roland Köstler, Die Mitbestimmung in der SE, 2003 ZGR 800, 803.
323. See Klaus J. Hopt & Markus Roth, § 100, in AKTIENGESETZ:
GROßKOMMENTAR, supra note 35, no. 90.
324. Commission Recommendation of 15 February 2005 on the Role of Nonexecutive or Supervisory Directors of Listed Companies and on the Committees of the
(Supervisory) Board, 2005/162, 2005 O.J. (L 52) 51.
325. Id. at 63, Annex II, 1(b).
326. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, supra note 258, at 42 (finding the actual number to be
21% of all supervisory directors).
327. GERMAN JURISTS FORUM, MUNICH 2012, supra note 89, Business Law Section,
Resolution 12.a (approved 76:10:9).
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D. INDEPENDENCE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR CO-DETERMINATION AND THE
TWO-TIER STRUCTURE?
1. Independent Directors in Co-Determined Boards
The independent director paradigm was invented in countries in
which boards were not subject to mandatory co-determination.328 In the
United States, the independence requirement has existed for a long time.
Since 1940, the Investment Company Act has required 40% of
investment fund directors to be independent.329 By contrast, German
boards today have a rather small ratio of independent directors.330 This
is due in part to quasi-parity co-determination for large companies with
over 2,000 employees in Germany.331 Although it is disputed whether
employee representatives are independent, they are not treated as
independent by international proxy advisors such as ISS.332 German
academia is split; the better view is that employee representatives are
not independent.333 ISS call for the board to be one-third independent in
co-determined German companies.334 For quasi-parity co-determined
companies, this means that two-thirds of shareholder representatives
have to be independent.
In order to highlight the problems arising from the implementation
of independence in co-determined boards, it is helpful to note that the
independence requirement in the US Investment Companies Act is
contrasted by the absence of independent directors on the boards of
pension funds.335 Employee representation on boards of occupational
pension institutions can be found at CalPERS in the US, as well as in the
UK and Switzerland. For a long time, Switzerland required mandatory
parity co-determination in the occupational pension sector.336 In the
UK, employees must appoint one-third of the trustees, with the State
328.
329.

See Roth, Unabhängige Aufsichtsratsmitglieder, supra note 20, at 605.
See Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 112-90 § 10, 15 U.S.C. §
80a-10 (2006); see also ROTH, PRIVATE ALTERSVORSORGE 2009, supra note 123, at
214-18 ff (discussing the Investment Company Act of 1940 as well as the board
composition of individual pension institutions with independent directors).
330. See HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, supra note 258.
331. See supra Part I.A.2.
332. GUIDELINES, supra note 315, at 12.
333. See Roth, Unabhängige Aufsichtsratsmitglieder, supra note 20, at 630–631.
334. See GUIDELINES, supra note 315, at 8 (discussing board independence).
335. Only some pension funds like CalPERS give information about their boards.
336. Bundesgesetzes über die berufliche Alters-, Hinterlassenen- und
Invalidenversorgung (BVG), AS 797 (1983), art. 51, para. 1 (Switz.).
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Secretary authorized by the Pensions Act of 2004 to raise the employee
proportion to one-half.337 The California Government Code provides for
co-determination for CalPERS; the chairperson and the vice-chairperson
represent the interests of the beneficiaries.338 In Germany, however,
there is no mandatory board participation by beneficiaries or
occupational pensioners in support funds, retirement funds, pension
funds, or direct insurance offered by insurance companies.339 Following
the introduction of quasi-parity co-determination under the CoDetermination Act 1976 (Mitbestimungsgesetz (MitbestG) 1976), the
book reserves intended to cover pension obligations often exceeded the
equity capital.340 With the increase of external funding of occupational
pensions, mostly by Dax-30 companies, the employee representatives of
the supervisory board can no longer be considered representatives of a
“different form of capital.”341
Other European countries implemented up to one-third parity codetermination at the board level.342 Though it has co-determined boards
in principle, the Netherlands has the highest ratio of independent board
members in Europe.343 The Dutch Corporate Governance Code provides
that all but one member of the supervisory board shall be independent.344
Company employees and union officials involved in collective
bargaining are excluded from representing employees on the supervisory
board, unlike in Germany.345 However, international holding companies

337.
338.

Pensions Act, 2004, c. 35, § 243(1) (Eng.).
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 20090 (West 2012). Currently, Rob Feckner serves as
Board president, representative of the school members, and George Diehr serves as
Board vice president, representative of the state members. Press Release, CalPERS,
CalPERS Board Re-Elects Feckner as President; Diehr as Vice President (Jan. 14,
2003), available at http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about/press/pr-2013/
jan/board-reelects.xml.
339. ROTH, PRIVATE ALTERSVORSORGE 2009, supra note 123, at 209–14, 327–30.
340. Ernst Steindorff, Einzelfragen zur Reichweite des Mitbestimmungsgesetzes,
1977 ZHR 457, 464 (Ger.).
341. See Kübler, supra note 8, at 108 (original source); see also ROTH, PRIVATE
ALTERSVORSORGE 2009, supra note 123, at 209–10.
342. See Roth, Employee Participation, supra note 4, at 71–72 (2010).
343. See HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, supra note 258, at 42, 45.
344. DUTCH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, art. III.2.1 (2008).
345. BURGERLIJK WETBOEK [BW] [DUTCH CIVIL CODE], art. 2:270 (Neth.).
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are co-determination-free; companies may implement co-determination
at the highest national level.346
The Australian approach347 of not counting employee
representatives is in line with national custom, and it appears to be more
suitable than the ISS approach. There would be some pressure on
Germany to call for more co-determination if the majority of
shareholder representatives were independent, but none of the employee
representatives fit the description. Becoming a European company may
create some diversity on the employee side, but that is not a real option
if all the employees are working in Germany. If representatives of the
controlling shareholder are treated as independent, employee
representatives must be treated as independent as well.
2. Establishing Two-Tier Boards or Co-Determination in the US?
Even if co-determination was supported by some US economists348
and viewed more favorably after the way the financial crisis was
handled in Germany, the spread of co-determination in the US hardly
seems realistic. This is true even when taking into account codetermination in state pension funds and looking at independent
directors as a substitute for labor representatives on the board of
CalPERS, for example. The introduction of a two-tiered structure might
be a better bet, even if it does not seem feasible today or in the near
future. Such structures might arguably exist in the NYSE.349 From a
comparative perspective, the system in which all directors other than the
CEO are independent resembles a two-tiered structure. Such a
functional view is even more appealing if one takes into account the fact
that management boards in German companies usually attend entire
supervisory board meetings. Recomposing and transforming boards into

346. See HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, supra note 258, at 42, 45 (explaining the high
ratio of independent directors).
347. AUSTRALIAN COUNCIL OF SUPER INVESTORS (ACSI), INTERNATIONAL VOTING
ALERT GUIDELINES 15 (2010).
348. See Larry Fauver & Michael E. Fuerst, Does Good Corporate Governance
Include Employee Representation? Evidence from German Corporate Boards, 82 J.
FIN. ECON. 673 (2006) (discussing the criticalness of only quasi-parity codetermination); for a view critical towards quasi-parity co-determination, see Gary
Gorton & Frank A. Schmid, Capital, Labor, and the Firm: A Study of German
Codetermination, 2 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 863 (2004).
349. Andreas M. Fleckner, Stock Exchanges at the Crossroads, 74 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2541, 2614 (2006) (on reporting to the independent directors).
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a two-tier system might be a practical option if US Corporate
Governance standards of independence are raised and significant
shareholders and founders are considered dependent. If it still happens
that more than two-thirds of the board consists of independent directors,
it would be a practical choice to separate executives and non-executives
onto different boards. In Europe, choosing between one-tier and twotier boards is now becoming the norm;350 following the Habersack
Report,351 the German Jurists Forum is now recommending that same
choice for German stock corporations.352
III. BALANCING DIRECTOR PRIMACY AND SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS
A. STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF SHAREHOLDERS
1. Shareholder Empowerment in the US
The Dodd-Frank Act introduced European standards of shareholder
rights to the United States.353 Since then, it has been possible for
shareholders to nominate directors and to call for the separation of the
Chairman of the Board and CEO roles; these have been two basic
features of German company law since the 1861 enactment of the
Commercial Code (which was codified in 1884).354 According to its
350.
351.
352.

Hopt, supra note 210, at 23.
HABERSACK, supra note 88, at 70–71, 103.
GERMAN JURISTS FORUM, MUNICH 2012, supra note 89, Business Law Section,
Resolution 19 (adopted by vote of 53 in favor, 26 against, and 5 abstentions) (the
legislator should allow all stock corporations, as is the case already for European
Companies (SE), to choose between the two-tier and the one-tier board).
353. See Cools, supra note 16, at 742–43, 745–47; Bebchuk, The Case for
Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 15, at 847.
354. The Commercial Code of 1861 [Allgemeines Deutches Handelsgesetzbuch
(ADHGB)] transformed the ‘conseil de surveillance’ of the French Act on partnerships,
limiting it to shares of the stock corporation itself. INVESTORS’ WORKING GRP., US
FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: THE INVESTORS’ PERSPECTIVE 23 (2009), available
athttp://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/dodd-frank_act/07_01_09_iwg_
report.pdf. See Roth, Information und Organisation des Aufsichtsrats, supra note 316,
at 376–77. The reform in 1884 introduced a new Article 225a which foresaw personal
incompatibility of management and supervisory board. See also Entwurf eines Gesetzes,
betreffend die Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien und die Aktiengesellschaften vom 7.
März 1884 (Aktenstück Nr. 21). Teil 2, in HUNDERT JAHRE MODERNES AKTIENRECHT
447, 461 (Werner Schubert & Peter Hommelhoff eds., 1985) (notes on the
governmental draft).
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policy statement, CII campaigned for the central corporate governance
components of the Dodd-Frank Act, which were, inter alia, introduced
by Senator Schumer and Maria Cantwell as the “Shareholder Bill of
Rights.”355 In its policy statement, CII explicitly referred to European
standards,356 stating that “[i]n the United States, unlike most of Europe,
the only way that shareholders can run their own candidates is by
waging a full-blown election contest, printing and mailing their own
proxy cards to shareholders. For most investors, this process would be
onerous and prohibitively expensive.”357
One noticeable omission within US company law is the absence of
federal company law. It is disputed whether the competition between
the states for corporate business produced a race to the top or a race to
the bottom. Either way, Delaware, as the long-time champion of that
competition, is not only responive to business in its state policies—for
example, granting corporations the opportunity to exculpate directors for
breaches of the duty of care after Smith v. Van Gorkom358—but also has
well-equipped, professional, and specialized courts (e.g., the Court of
Chancery) for company proceedings.359 The practice of excluding
shareholders from management decisions was developed in the early
20th century and served as a blueprint for German legislation some 75
years ago, with German financial institutions providing the initiative.360
In contrast, institutional investors in the United States campaigned in the
opposite direction, namely to raise shareholder rights.
2. Stewardship Codes
The corporate governance responsibilities of institutional investors
are currently being debated. As a result of the recent financial and
355. Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S. 1074, 111th Cong. (2009). See also
Press Release, Senator Charles E. Schumer, Schumer, Cantwell Announce ‘Shareholder
Bill of Rights’ to Impose Greater Accountability on Corporate America (May 19,
2009), available at http://www.schumer.senate.gov/new_website/record.cfm?
id=313468.
356. INVESTORS’ WORKING GRP., US FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: THE
INVESTORS’ PERSPECTIVE 23 (2009), available at http://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_
advocacy/dodd-frank_act/07_01_09_iwg_report.pdf.
357. For a German view, see Alexander Hellgardt & Andreas Hoger,
Transatlantische Konvergenz der Aktionärsrechte, 2011 ZGR 38.
358. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
359. For the German perspective, see JAN VON HEIN, DIE REZEPTION USAMERIKANISCHEN GESELLSCHAFTSRECHTS IN DEUTSCHLAND 479–83 (2008).
360. See infra Part III.B.
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economic crisis, institutional investors have been criticized for not
exercising sufficient control over companies,361 though many European
companies already have a corporate governance or voting policy.362 It
was against this backdrop in November of 2009 that the British
Institutional Shareholders Committee presented a Code on the
responsibility of institutional investors.363 Dealing with the same issue,
the Stewardship Code was passed a few months earlier in July of 2009
by the British Financial Reporting Council;364 the latter also revised the
Combined Code and subsequently published it as the UK Corporate
Governance Code.365 The increasing emphasis on the importance of
shareholders in corporate governance, as well as their glaring failure
before and during the financial crisis, suggests that it may obtain
significant importance.366 The European Commission Green Paper also
addresses the issue,367 and similar initiatives can be found in France368
and the Netherlands.369

361. See, e.g., DAVID WALKER, A REVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN UK
BANKS AND OTHER FINANCIAL INDUSTRY ENTITIES: FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS 5.10–
5.12 (2009) [hereinafter WALKER REVIEW].
362. RISKMETRICS, STUDY ON MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT PRACTICES IN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE MEMBER STATES 159 (2009). A majority of the
companies that were questioned welcomed a duty to report on their Corporate
Governance policy. Id. at 164
363. INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDERS COMM. (ISC), CODE ON THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (2009).
364. UK STEWARDSHIP CODE (2012), available at http://www.frc.org.uk/
getattachment/e2db042e-120b-4e4e-bdc7-d540923533a6/UK-Stewardship-CodeSeptember-2012.aspx.
365. See infra Part IV.
366. For a contrary view, see Holger Fleischer, Zukunftsfragen der Corporate
Governance in Deutschland und Europa, 2011 ZGR 155, 164–65 (questioning the
merits of having the Code function as a role model).
367. Green Paper, supra note 24, at 11 (stating that there is a lack of appropriate
shareholder engagement), 13 (asset managers as active stewards of the investee
companies).
368. LE CLUB DES JURISTES, COMMISSION RECOMMANDATIONS ET BONNES
PRACTIQUES À L’ATTENTION DES ÉMETTEURS ET DES INVETISSEURS INSTITUTIONELS
(2010).
369. EUMEDION CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FORUM, BEST PRACTICES FOR ENGAGED
SHARE-OWNERSHIP INTENDED FOR EUMEDION PARTICIPANTS 1 (2011).
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B. THE LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLE IN THE GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION
ACT 1937
If one were to count reinsurance companies as private pension
institutions, or examine the traditional close ties between Munich Re
(previously Münchener Rück) and Allianz, then even in Germany,
private pension institutions have played a significant role in promoting
corporate governance.370 The Stock Corporation Act (Aktienrecht) of
1937, which laid the foundation for the still applicable organizational
structure (Organisationsverfassung) of the German Stock Corporation,
is based largely on the ideas of various figures in the financial industry
such as Wilhelm Kißkalt, CEO of Münchener Rück at that time.371 In
1934, in a report by Kißkalt for the Commission on Stock Corporation
Law published in the Journal of the Academy for German Law,372
Kißkalt anticipated the stock corporation’s organizational structure and
forewarned of the board of directors’ duty to take into account the
interests of employees as well as that of the common good
(Allgemeinwohl).373 He further suggested keeping the supervisory board
as small as possible, with seven supervisory board members.374
Johannes C.D. Zahn’s Wirtschaftsführertum und Vertragsethik im neuen
Aktienrecht (Leadership and Ethics in the New Stock Corporation
Law),375 which he wrote during his time as legal advisor for the
association of private banks (Centralverband des deutschen Bank- und
Bankgewerbes), also had an impact on the drafting of the Stock
Corporations Act.376 During the drafting of the new Stock Corporation
370. See Peter O. Mülbert, Corporate Governance of Banks, 10 EBOR 411, 424–25
(2009) (discussing corporate governance for banks).
371. MICHAEL STOLLEIS, GEMEINWOHLFORMELN IM NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN
RECHT 152 (1974) (testifying to Kißkalt’s strong influence in the Academy for German
Law).
372. For the discussion, see 1 AKADEMIE FÜR DEUTSCHES RECHT, 1933–1945:
PROTOKOLLE DER AUSSCHÜSSE/AUSSCHUß FÜR AKTIENRECHT, PROTOCOLS (Werner
Schubert ed., 1986).
373. WILHELM KIßKALT, REFORM DES AKTIENRECHTS, in 1 ZEITSCHRIFT DER
AKADMEIE FÜR DEUTSCHES RECHT [ZAkDR] 20 (1934).
374. Wilhelm Kißkalt, Bericht über die 2. Erweiterte Sitzung vom 9.2.1934, in 19331945: PROTOKOLLE DER AUSSCHÜSSE/AUSSCHUß FÜR AKTIENRECHT 68 (1986); FRANZ
SCHLEGELBERGER, DIE ERNEUERUNG DES DEUTSCHEN AKTIENRECHTS 26 (1935)
(pleading for 7-9 supervisory board members).
375. JOHANNES C. D. ZAHN, WIRTSCHAFTSFÜHRERTUM UND VERTRAGSETHIK IM
NEUEN AKTIENRECHT (1934).
376. See KIßKALT, supra note 373, at 20.
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Act, Zahn became general manager of the association of private banks;
he later became CEO of the Bank Trinkhaus, now known as HSBC
Trinkhaus.377 Finally, the financial industry’s influence on the current
organizational structure of the German Stock Corporation was
completed by the Minister of Trade and Industry at the time, Kurt
Schmitt, whom Kißkalt had earlier appointed to the Allianz board.378
Keeping with the tradition of stock corporation law reform that
took place during the Weimar Republic,379 the organizational structure
of the reform was developed comparatively:380 In his monograph to US
law, which was well-founded at the time, Zahn referred to the status of
the general meeting of shareholders. 381 It also seems reasonable to
presume Kißkalt’s proximity to the United States, seeing that he joined
the board after the ‘Catastrophe of San Francisco’ (Katastrophe von San
Fransisco), a disastrous 1906 earthquake that caused a series of fires and
destroyed much of the city.382 This explanatory pattern with regard to
the supervisory board—which is of particular interest here—does appear
to be complex, particularly given that in the United States the
construction of the supervisory board as a board of directors was sought
to be halted in Germany.383 The founding of the supervisory board
through
the
Commercial
Code
(Allgemeines
Deutsches
Handelsgesetzbuch (ADHGB)) of 1861384 marked a major legal

377. Johannes Zahn, MUNZINGER ARCHIVE, http://www.munzinger.de/search/
document?index=mol00&id=00000005034&type=text/html&query.key=aY7y5d6Y&te
mplate=/publikationen/personen/document.jsp&preview=.
378. See GERALD D. FELDMAN, DIE ALLIANZ ÜND DIE DEUTSCHE
VERSICHERUNGSWIRTSCHAFT 1933-1945 (2001).
379. See, e.g., WALTER HALLSTEIN, DIE AKTIENRECHTE DER GEGENWART: GESETZE
ÜND ENTWÜRFE IN RECHTSVERGLEICHENDER DARSTELLUNG (1931).
380. Markus Roth, Besondere Regeln für geschlossene und börsennotierte
Gesellschaften: Überlegungen aus Anlass des 67. Deutschen Juristentages 2008, in
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KLAUS J. HOPT ZUM 70: UNTERNEHMEN, MARKT UND
VERANTWORTUNG 1261, 1268–69 (Stefan Grundmann et al. eds., 2010).
381. See ZAHN, supra note 375, at 95; see also Lamb v. Lehmann, 143 N.E. 276,
278 (Ohio 1924); Manson v. Curtis, 119 N.E. 559, 562 (N.Y. 1918).
382. See Biography of Wilhelm Kißkalt, in AKADEMIE FÜR DEUTSCHES RECHT, supra
note 372, at LVI.
383. See Kißkalt, Bericht über die 2. Erweiterte Sitzung vom 9.2.1934, supra note
374, at 47; see also ZAHN, supra note 375, at 202 (though he does not mention the
independence of the management board from the supervisory board).
384. See JAN LIEDER, DER AUFSICHTSRAT IM WANDEL DER ZEIT (2006) (providing a
historical overview); MARCUS LUTTER, Der Aufsichtsrat im Wandel der Zeit - von

2013]

PENSION CAPITALISM

805

innovation, though at that point in time setting up the supervisory board
was still optional.385 Until then, control of German Stock Corporations
was still largely, but by no means exclusively, held by the board of
directors.386 With the lapse of government supervision and the transition
to the formation of stock corporations simply by fulfilling the legal
requirements of the Commercial Code, the supervisory board became a
compulsory company organ.387 The board of directors was maintained
in corporate practice, as expressly authorized by the Commercial Code
of 1884.388 Under Article 225 (3) of the Commercial Code of 1884,
further tasks could be given to the supervisory board, since it was
devised in practice as a de facto board of directors.389 In 1933, a later
editor of a monograph on the Stock Corporation Act of 1937, Friedrich
Klausing, resisted a reversal of the de facto board of directors into a
supervisory organ in the true sense; he later published the Stock
Corporation Act of 1937, including an official explanatory report, in
which he commented elaborately on the leadership principle,390 though
still with a fair degree of skepticism.391
seinen Anfängen bis heute, in 2 AKTIENRECHT IM WANDEL 389–91 (Walter Bayer &
Mathias Habersack eds., 2007).
385. Klaus J. Hopt, Zur Funktion des Aufsichtsrats im Verhältnis von Industrie und
Bankensystem, in RECHT UND ENTWICKLUNG DER GROßUNTERNEHMEN IM 19. UND
FRÜHEN 20. JAHRHUNDERT 227, 231–32 (Norbert Horn & Jürgen Kocka eds., 1979).
386. Klaus J. Hopt, Ideelle und wirtschaftliche Grundlagen der Aktien-, Bank- und
Börsenrechtsentwicklung im 19. Jahrhundert, in 5 WISSENSCHAFT UND KODIFIKATION
DES PRIVATRECHTS IM 19. JAHRHUNDERT: GELD UND BANKEN 128, 152–54 (Helmut
Coing & Walter Wilhelm eds., 1980).
387. See Gesetz, betreffend die Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien und die
Aktiengesellschaften, June 11, 1870, Bundesgesetzblatt des Norddeutschen bundes
[Federal Gazette of the North German Confederation], at 375, 378 (1870) (Ger.).
388. See Explanatory memorandum of the Commercial Code of 1884, reprinted in
Entwurf eines Gesetzes, betreffend die Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien und die
Aktiengesellschaften vom 7. März 1884 (Aktenstück Nr. 21). Teil 2, supra note 354, at
387, 447, 461.
389. See HERRMANN STAUB & ALBERT PINNER, 2 STAUB’S KOMMENTAR ZUM
HANDELSGESETZBUCH § 246, Anm. 10 (14th ed. 1932) (discussing the relevant
implications); RICHARD PASSOW, DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 397–98 (2d ed. 1922). See
also Klaus J. Hopt & Markus Roth, § 95 and § 111, in AKTIENGESETZ:
GROßKOMMENTAR, supra note 35, nos. 4–9, 563–68 (respectively).
390. See FRIEDRICH KLAUSING, GESETZ ÜBER AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN UND
KOMMANDITGESELLSCHAFTEN
AUF
AKTIEN
(AKTIENGESETZ)
NEBST
EINFÜHRUNGSGESETZ UND “AMTLICHER BEGRÜNDUNG” 59–61 (1937) (on the leadership
principle).
391. See FRIEDRICH KLAUSING, REFORM DES AKTIENRECHTS 249 (1933).
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An important new aspect of the organizational structure included in
the Stock Corporation Act of 1937 was the exclusion of the general
meeting of management.392 This made it possible to portray the
management as ‘Führer,’ thereby raising the level of approval of the
stock corporation as a legal form in the Third Reich, which was
necessary because of the danger of falling out of favor at the beginning
of the that period.393 Kißkalt justified his proposal with the missing
practical significance of the general meeting’s status, by saying that he
did not know of any cases in which the general meeting encroached on
the management of the company.394 At the decisive second meeting,
Kißkalt explicitly called on “gentlemen of the younger generation” to
come up with new ideas and thoughts.395 These included Cornelius
Freiherr Heyl zu Herrnhausen, who demanded the abolition of the
supervisory board;396 Hans Würdinger, who proposed a distinction
between management shareholders (Verwaltungsaktionäre) and bearer
shareholders, with only the former having a voting right;397 and Werner
Bachmann, who wanted the management board to be appointed by the
supervisory board only and then confirmed by a government agency.398
The last speaker at the meeting was Zahn, whose proposals regarding
the disempowerment of the general meeting and more subordinately, the
limiting of the supervisory board’s powers eventually found their way,
to a large extent, into the Stock Corporation Act of 1937.399 It can be
assumed that Zahn’s proposals represented the ideas of the banks, which
in the 1920s and the 1930s held the majority of the supervisory board
seats.400
392.
393.

Stock Corporation Act, Jan. 30, 1937, RGBL. I at 107, § 95 (5) 1 (Ger.).
Roth, Besondere Regeln für geschlossene und börsennotierte Gesellschaften,
Überlegungen aus Anlass des 67. Deutschen Juristentags 2008, supra note 374, at
1261, 1268, 1274 (explaining the reduction in the number of stock corporations as a
result of of the introduction of the minimum capital regime).
394. See Kißkalt, Bericht über die 2. Erweiterte Sitzung vom 9.2.1934, supra note
374, at 47–48 (noting that none of the people present were aware of such cases).
395. See id. at 20.
396. See id. at 21–23.
397. See id. at 26–28.
398. See id. at 36–37.
399. See id. at 60–65; see also ZAHN, supra note 375.
400. See Karoline Krenn, Von der “Macht der Banken” zur Leitidee des deutschen
Produktionsregimes Bank-Industrie Verflechtung am Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts, 53
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR UNTERNEHMENSGESCHICHTE [ZUG] 70 (2008) (for a more detailed
account); see also Karoline Krenn, ALLE MACHT DEN BANKEN? ZUR STRUKTUR
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C. PRINCIPLES SURROUNDING ENLIGHTENED DIRECTOR PRIMACY
1. Shareholders Directly Contacting Independent Directors
Stewardship Codes are associated with institutional shareholders
seeking contact with independent directors.401 The relevant pension
associations in the United States and Australia, where no such Codes
exist, stress that institutional investors should have access to the
independent board members.402 Though such contact is rarely discussed
in Germany,403 it is also possible under German law.
2. Director Accountability and Adequate Compensation
Some of the principles that were strengthened in order to balance
the introduction of director primacy in the German Stock Corporation
Act of 1937 were director liability,404 adequate director compensation,405
and annual discharge of liability406 for all board members (management
and supervisory boards). The latter does not lead to exemption from
liability, but rather is a mandatory signal of trust at every annual general
meeting. These principles are also relevant for long-termism, and

NETZWERKE DEUTSCHER UNTERNEHMEN AM BEGINN DES 20.
JAHRHUNDERTS (2012).
401. See UK STEWARDSHIP CODE, Guidance to Principle 4 (suggesting that
institutional investors consider contacting independent directors when they have
concerns); see also id., Guidance to Principle 3 (advising institutional investors to meet
with the chairman and, where appropriate, with other board members, to ensure that
independent directors provide adequate oversight).
402. See AUSTRALIAN COUNCIL OF SUPER INVESTORS (ACSI), A GUIDE FOR
SUPERANNUATION TRUSTEES TO MONITOR LISTED AUSTRALIAN COMPANIES (ACSI
GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES) § 18(c) (2011) (“The board should respond, where
practicable, to communications from shareholders. In particular, shareholders should
have access to non-executive directors.”).
403.
In the UK, such contacts (especially of the senior independent director) signal
good corporate governance. See UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE § E.1.1 (2012),
available at http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/UKCorporate-Governance-Code-September-2012.aspx.
404. See infra Part IV.B.3.
405. See infra Part IV.B.1.
406. See Roth, Information und Organisation des Aufsichtsrats, supra note 316, at
368–69.
PERSONALER
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therefore will hopefully contribute to the international discussion in a
more sustainable manner than capital requirements.407
IV. LONG-TERMISM
A. LONG-TERMISM IN THE INTERNATIONAL DISCUSSION
1. Long-Termism in the European Commission Green Paper on
Corporate Governance
The Green Paper on corporate governance dicusses the
inconsistency between the increasing importance of private pension
institutions and the short-termism of capital markets generally.408
Although private pension institutions have long-term obligations to their
beneficiaries and their participation in capital markets has risen
(according to the European Commission), the investment horizons in the
last 20 years have decreased; due to a turnover of 150% of market
capitalization, the average investment period is set to be eight months.409
The Walker Review already identified this inconsistency.410 The
European Commission is remarkably frank in inquiring about rules that
counteract the long-term interests of institutional investors,411 and taking
into account the relationship between private pension institutions and
their asset managers.412
At present, there are no concrete measures in sight that would
promote long-term investment by long-term-oriented investors.413 In

407. See Fleischer, supra note 366, at 155, 169 (hoping for a transformation in
German law); see also MARCUS LUTTER, KAPITAL, SICHERUNG DER
KAPITALAUFBRINGUNG UND KAPITALERHALTUNG IN DEN AKTIEN- UND GMBH-RECHTEN
DER EWG (1964); Marcus Lutter, Legal Capital in Europe, 1 ECFR, Special Volume
(2006).
408. See Green Paper, supra note 24, at 3 (presenting this as the second and most
detailed point of its “three subjects which are at the heart of good corporate
governance”). The other two points deal with the board of directors and the duty to
comply or explain. See id.
409. See id. at 12.
410. See WALKER REVIEW, supra note 361, at 26–27.
411. See Green Paper, supra note 24, at 12.
412. See id. at 12–13.
413. See Green Paper Long-Term Financing of the European Economy, at 15, COM
(2013) 150 final (Mar. 25, 2013) (“Ideas have also been advanced to encourage greater
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France, shareholders that have held their shares for longer than two
years obtain a double vote.414 The Reflection Group recommended that
the articles of incorporation mandate that a higher dividend be given to
shareholders committed to long-term investments.415 This is to be
understood as a reaction to the change in ownership structure and the
dominance of portfolio investors. So far, long-term investors have only
had an incentive to monitor the management of their shares if their
holdings were large enough to intervene directly in the management of
the company.416 With dispersed ownership, by contrast, it is in the
short-term interest of institutional investors and their ‘principals’ (the
beneficiaries) to sell their holdings swiftly,417 as the costs of control
typically exceed the uncertain reward.
An additional dividend for shareholders committed to long-term
investments appears to be possible in Germany under the prevailing law.
It should be recognized that companies with dispersed ownership have
an interest in long-term, stable structures, and in appropriate
circumstances, a proportional encroachment on the rights of short-term
shareholders may be acceptable.418 Seen from the perspective of
minority shareholder protection, it is questionable whether ownermanagers, which are very important in Germany,419 should be entitled to
a special dividend, in addition to being given a control premium for
share sales.420 Alternative mechanisms to promote the control of
management by institutional investors could be the establishment of

long-term shareholder engagement . . . such as . . . granting increased voting rights or
dividends to long-term shareholders.”).
414. Code De Commerce [C. COM] art. L225-123 (Fr.) (stating that adouble voting
right can be provided for in the articles of association or in an extraordinary general
meeting).
415. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, INTERNAL MKTS. AND SERVS., REPORT OF THE
REFLECTION GROUP ON THE FUTURE OF EU COMPANY LAW 47 (2011).
416. See STEFAN PRIGGE, A Survey of German Corporate Governance, in
COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING
RESEARCH 945, 974 tbl. 9 (Klaus J. Hopt et al. eds., 1998) (on the ownership structure at
the end of the 20th Century).
417. For a principles-based account, see ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND
LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS AND STATES (1970).
418. On the requirements, see, for example, UWE HÜFFER, AKTIENGESETZ [AKTG]:
KOMMENTAR § 53a, comment 10 (9th ed. 2010).
419. Some examples of family-owned companies in the DAX are Beiersdorf, BMW,
and Metro.
420. See Fleischer, supra note 366, at 166–67.
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special committees of long-term investors, for example,421 or the
establishment of such committees on the supervisory board. In
Deutschland AG, the bank representatives on the supervisory boards
fulfilled a similar role.422
European reforms will probably focus on investor and financial
reporting rules for long-term investors and their relationships with asset
managers. In Germany, the laws on investments and deposits for life
insurance companies make it essentially impossible for them to invest in
comapny shares.423 In light of rising government debt, the risk of
investments in shares, including occupational pensions, will have to be
reconsidered.424 Asset managers’ remuneration of private pension
institutions should be done on a long-term basis.425
The OECD installed a working group to focus on the issue of
longer-term investments and published its first policy paper.426
Globally, it is a challenge for the pension fund industry to bring its
contracts with asset managers in line with its long-term obligations via
its clients. Ensuring that hedge funds do not bet against the rest of the
portfolio of the pension fund, thereby causing perhaps even more longterm harms by achieving short-term gains, seems difficult, if not
impossible to achieve.
2. Changing Pension Design?
Enhancing long-termism in occupational pensions is not an easy
task, especially since it is difficult to implement long-term investing.
Matching pension obligations with long-term debt ignores the
421. See WALKER REVIEW, supra note 361, at 26–27, 72–75 (considering the
introduction of institutional shareholder committees).
422. See PAUL MYNERS, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: A
REVIEW (MYNERS REPORT) 1–2 (2001) (likening a “strong funded pension system” to a
“key national asset”).
423. See ROTH, PRIVATE ALTERSVORSORGE 2009, supra note 123, at 298–300.
424. See Markus Roth, Anmerkung zu EuGH, Urteil vom 15.07.2010 – C-271/08,
Ausschreibung von Betriebsrentenzusagen, 2011 EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
ARBEITSRECHT [EUZA] 213, 218.
425. See Commission Recommendation on Remuneration Policies in the Financial
Services Sector, C(2009) 3159 (Apr. 30, 2009) (recommending alignment of a
remuneration policy with a long-term business plan).
426. Raffaele Della Croce, Fiona Stewart & Juan Yermo, Promoting Longer-Term
Investment by Institutional Investors: Selected Issues and Policies, 2011 OECD J. FIN.
MKT. TRENDS 1.
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insolvency risk of firms and states. It is necessary to develop and
practice an overall investment strategy. Short investment horizons are
not per se unsustainable, and an effort should be made to avoid
imperfect portfolios with different asset managers in danger of betting
against each other.
In an ideal occupational pension plan design, automatic enrollment
should be strengthened.427
In the United Kingdom, automatic
enrollment was introduced by the Pension Act of 2008, leading to higher
pension contributions of both employers and employees; with some state
aid the total came to about 8% of employee earnings.428 The concept of
automatic enrollment was also endorsed by the German Jurists Forum in
2004429 and in 2011 by the AbA, the German association on Occupation
Pensions.430 In the United States, many studies reflect favorably on
automatic enrollment by showing improvements in participation rates
and contributions.431 A recent study also showed that large plans with
automatic enrollment have significantly fewer costs than large plans
without it, or small plans.432
With the general trend of the elderly working longer, occupational
pensions seem to be acceptable even without guaranteeing a specific
pension age. Pension age is rising in Germany, making lifetime
working accounts that can be transferred into pension rights at will more
attractive.433 Such multi-channeling might also provide the opportunity
for saving via occupational pensions with the option for earlier
retirement. Occupational pensions should also be accessible before

427. See OECD PENSIONS OUTLOOK 2012, supra note 124, at 125; ROTH, PRIVATE
ALTERSVORSORGE 2009, supra note 123, at 661–62.
428. Pensions Act, 2008, c. 30, § 20 (Eng.).
429. 65. DEUTSCHER JURISTENTAG, BONN 2004: BESCHLÜSSE [65TH GERMAN
JURISTS FORUM, BONN 2004: DECISIONS], Private Pensions (2004) [hereinafter GERMAN
JURISTS FORUM, BONN 2004].
430. ABA – ARBEITSGEMEINSCHAFT FÜR BETRIEBLICHE ALTERSVERSORUNG E.V.,
DIALOG PRO BETRIEBSRENTE: MEMORANDUM FÜR EINE NEUJUSTIERUNG DER
ALTERSVERSORGUNG IN DEUTSCHLAND 15–16, 3.3 (2011) (opting out).
431. See Akerlof, supra note 149, at 424; see also Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H.
Thaler, Save More Tomorrow: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee
Saving, 112 J. POL. ECON. 164 (2004), RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).
432. DELOITTE, INSIDE THE STRUCTURE OF DEFINED CONTRIBUTION/401(K) PLAN
FEES: A STUDY ASSESSING THE MECHANICS OF THE ‘ALL-IN’ FEE (2011).
433. See
ANNEKATRIN VEIT, ARBEITSZEITKONTEN UND BETRIEBLICHE
ALTERSVERSORGUNG (2008).
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normal retirement age.434 Generally, the confidence in guarantees435 has
deteriorated due to the financial crisis and the ongoing accumulation of
state debts following it, leading to a state debt crisis.
B. GERMAN LONG-TERMISM COMPANY LAW PRINCIPLES
1. Adequate Management Compensation
Another politically relevant issue, management remuneration,436
has now taken on a longer-term focus worldwide.437 In the background
of this issue is the multilevel principal/agent problem; the dualistic
board structure in Germany makes this problem particularly pertinent.
Asset managers are agents of the pensioners and supervisory directors
are agents of the shareholders, and essentially the asset managers.
Management board members are agents of the supervisory directors.
The existing rules on management remuneration, and the liability they
imposed, were already reformed in Germany before the end of the
financial crisis.438 Under the provisions of the VorstAG,439 the
remuneration of management board members of listed companies must
be based on sustainable company development (§ 87 (1) German Stock
Corporation Act).440

434. See ROTH, PRIVATE ALTERSVORSORGE 2009, at 608 (the minimum age for
occupational pensions in Germany is 60).
435. See id. at 193–242 (2009).
436. See Klaus J. Hopt, Reformprobleme im Handels-, Gesellschafts- und
Abschlussprüferrecht, in KOMPATIBILITÄT DES TÜRKISCHEN UND EUROPÄISCHEN
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHTS 21, 34 (Yesim M. Atamer & Klaus J. Hopt eds., 2009); see also
Christoph Engel, Das schwindende Vertrauen in die Marktwirtschaft und die Folgen für
das Recht, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KLAUS J. HOPT ZUM 70, supra note 380, at 2733, 2743–
45.
437. See Guido Ferrarini, Niamh Moloney & Maria Cristina Ungureanu, Executive
Remuneration in Crisis: A Critical Assessment of Reforms in Europe, 10 J. CORP. L.
STUDIES [JCLS] 73 (2010) (explaining the executive remuneration in Europe).
438. Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung (VorStAG) [Adequate
Management Remuneration Act], July 31, 2009, BGBL I at 2509; see Klaus-Stefan
Hohenstatt, Das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung, 30 ZIP 1349
(2009);
Eberhard
Vetter,
Begrenzung
der
Vorstandsbezüge
durch
Hauptversammlungsbeschluss?, 30 ZIP 1307 (2009).
439. Adequate Management Remuneration Act, July 31, 2009, BGBL I at 2509.
440. See Commission Recommendation on Remuneration Policies in the Financial
Services Sector, C(2009) 3159, at 59–60 (Apr. 30, 2009).
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Internationally, there was a clear market failure with respect to the
calculation of executive salaries.441 As a solution to this, the United
States endorsed the ‘say on pay’ model, based on the British one.442 As
a result of a referendum in Switzerland, ‘say on pay’ will be integrated
in the Swiss Constitution in the form of a mandatory vote at annual
meetings.443 The US pension funds demanded a ‘say on pay’ for the
United States at the time of enactment of recent financial market
regulations.444 The remuneration practice of directors has been
questioned by some within the United States for a while;445 however, the
academic focus is currently on the remuneration practice of banks.446
Financial service provider Hermes, as another example, now provides an
opinion on executive salaries in Germany due to the increasing
internationalization of share investments by Anglo-American pension
funds.447 However, there are two corporate law issues which are yet to
be resolved: first, whether the directors should be remunerated as
entrepreneurs or as company employees,448 and secondly, the extent to
which board members should be compensated by means of pension
441.
442.

See WALKER REVIEW, supra note 361, at 27.
Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say on Pay”: Cautionary Notes on the U.K. Experience
and the Case for Shareholder Opt-in, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 323 (2009).
443. Bundesverfassung [BV] [CONSTITUTION] Mar. 3, 2013, art. 95, para. 3 (Switz.).
The Swiss regulation is heavily discussed in Germany and may lead to further changes
of the German Stock Corporation Act. The Adequate Management Remuneration Act
in 2009, supra note 439, also introduced a say-on-pay regulation. Resolutions of the
general meeting concerning the system on remuneration of managing directors are
possible, but not binding. See Stock Corporation Act, Sept. 6, 1965, BGBL. I at 1089, §
120 (4), last amended by Restructuring Act, Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900 (Ger.).
444. See INVESTORS’ WORKING GRP., supra note 349, at 6; see also Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 951, 124
Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010).
445. LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE M. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE - THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 1 (2004).
446. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J.
247 (2010).
447. Sven Oliver Clausen, Aktionäre erzwingen Votum über Vorstandsgehälter, FIN.
TIMES DEUTSCHLAND (Ger.), Sept. 9, 2009, available at http://www.ftd.de/finanzen/
maerkte/:druck-von-hermes-aktionaere-erzwingen-votum-uebervorstandsgehaelter/50014388.html.
448. Peter O. Mülbert, Shareholder Value aus rechtlicher Sicht, 1997 ZGR 129, 147
(favoring a shareholder value approach); see also Peter O. Mülbert,
Marktwertmaximierung als Unternehmensziel der Aktiengesellschaft, in FESTSCHRIFT
FÜR
VOLKER RÖHRICHT ZUM 65. GEBURTSTAG: GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT
RECHNUNGSLEGUNG SPORTRECHT 421 (Georg Crezelius et al. eds., 2005).
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claims (in which case the remuneration structure would be based on the
sustainable growth of the company).449
In listed companies, remuneration of management board members
must be aligned with the long-term success of the company.450 The
German Stock Corporation Act refers to ‘sustainability,’451 a phrase
developed in 18th century German forest sciences and today widely used
for environmental matters. In this context, ‘sustainability’ means longtermism as well as the careful handling of natural resources.452 Whether
the compensation of German executives has to be taken into account,
and what the environmental consequences of the business may be, has
not yet been discussed. The time needed for sustainable compensation
might also be subject to judicial review. The German Corporate
Governance Code refers only to multi-year compensation elements.453
Although the German Stock Corporation Act contains a similar
provision,454 this specification might be too short. Real long-termism in
management compensation might go beyond the five-year period
discussed today and may also deal with pension payments.455
2. Annual Discharge of Managing and Supervisory Directors
Annual discharge has been part of German practice since the early
19th century, and has been mandatory since the incorporation of the
leadership principle under the German Stock Corporation Act of
1937.456 Since then, ‘discharge’ is no longer simply a discharge from
liability, but a sign of confidence for managing and supervisory
directors. The company may not waive liability claims in the first three

449. See GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE § 4.2.2, § 4.2.3, § 4.2.5, model
tbl. 1 (2013). The 2013 amendment focused on management remuneration and on
pensions: levels and disclosures. To base variable compensation components on a
multi-year assessment (per the terms of § 4.2.3 of the German Corporate Governance
Code) will be insufficient to achieve sustainability.
450. Stock Corporation Act, § 87.
451. Id. § 87(1).
452. Gregor Thüsing & Gerrit Forst, Nachhaltigkeit als Zielvorgabe für die
Vorstandsvergütung, 2010 GESELLSCHAFTS-UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [GWR] 515.
453. GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE § 4.2.3 (2) 3.
454. Stock Corporation Act § 87 (1) 3.
455. Markus Roth, Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex 2012, 66 WERTPAPIERMITTEILUNGEN [WM] 1985 (2012).
456. Stock Corporation Act, § 70.
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years after director wrongdoings.457 In light of the financial crisis, the
limitation period for director liability was extended to ten years for
listed companies.458 Loss of such confidence is cause for the
supervisory board to remove management directors; international
scholars therefore assume ad nutum that removal is possible for
managing directors.459
Discharge and votes of confidence should be considered standardsetters in corporate governance. Annual re-elections of directors, as
advocated by institutional investors internationally, might prove to be
counterproductive when implementing long-termism in company law.
At least at first glance, it seems counterintuitive to expect a director to
seek re-election every year if corporate governance is directed to
promote the long-term success of the company. 460 Nevertheless, such
assumptions should not lead to the insulation of managers from
shareholders.461
Annual discharge of directors might even be
accompanied by mandatory annual votes at the general meeting on the
remuneration system and the maximum remuneration for managing
directors.
3. Deductibles in D&O Insurance
The introduction of director primacy in the German Stock
Corporation Act of 1937 was balanced by tightening liability
standards.462 If the premiums for D&O insurance are paid by the

457.
458.

Id. § 93 (4) 3.
Theodor Baums, Managerhaftung und Verjährung, 174 ZHR 593 (2010)

(Ger.).
459. Sofie Cools, Europe’s Ius Commune on Director Revocability, 8 ECFR 199
(2011).
460. Justice Jacobs of the Delaware Supreme Court promotes longer-term board
elections (such as for five years) instead of annual re-election. See Jack B. Jacobs,
“Patient Capital”: Can Delaware Corporate Law Help Revive It?, 68 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1645, 1657 (2011).
461. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term
Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
462. See supra Part III.C.2. For material standards of review, see Roth, Outside
Director Liability, supra note 35, at 346–50, 354–69; for procedural requirements see
Stock Corporation Act, Sept. 6, 1965, BGBL I at 1089, §§ 147–48, last amended by
Restructuring Act, Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL I at 1900 (Ger.). See also Habersack’s proposal
in the Habersack Report that every shareholder should be allowed to sue managing and
supervisory directors. HABERSACK, supra note 88, at 91–96 (2012). The proposal was
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company, the German Stock Corporation Act now mandatorily provides
a suitable deductible (though this idea was only a recommendation in
the German Corporate Governance Code).463
The Adequate
Management Remuneration Act amended the German Stock
Corporation Act in 2009.464 Now if a company takes out a D&O
insurance policy for the management board, a deductible of at least 10%
of the loss, consisting of up to 1.5 times the fixed annual compensation
of the management board member, must be agreed upon.465 The
German Corporate Governance Code recommends that a similar
deductible be agreed upon in any D&O policy for the supervisory
board.466
The financial crisis showed that some sectors’ appetite for risk was
too great.467 Regardless, it would be questionable to delete liability
exposure in practice.468 If generous standards of judicial review are not
met, personal liability leading to out-of-pocket payments must be an
option.469 Whether there should be a deductible, and what the scope of a
suitable deductible would be, can be worked out by referencing the
settlements in the Enron and the WorldCom cases.470 It may be
necessary to distinguish between violations of directors’ duties based on
the level of severity; directors’ personal assets could be used in this
calculation.471 It is useful to look at what other countries have done in
such a situation. In Japan, a cap for director liability is possible, but it
has to amount to the earnings of six years for executives and two years
rejected by the German Jurists Forum. GERMAN JURISTS FORUM, MUNICH 2012, supra
note 89, Business Law Section, Resolution 22.
463. Stock Corporation Act § 93(2)3.
464. Adequate Management Remuneration Act, July 31, 2009, BGBL I at 2509
(Ger.).
465. GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE § 3.8(2)(1).
466. Id. § 3.8(2)(2).
467. See WALKER REVIEW, supra note 361, at 52.
468. See TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT:
HOW LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION (2010).
469. See Bernard Black, Brian R. Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director
Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1070–71, 1089–95 (2006) (discussing the absence of
outside director liability in US company law cases after Smith v. Van Gorkom, until at
least 2004).
470. See id. at 1057 (explaining that to settle the WorldCom case, twelve outside
directors personally paid $24.75 million, and in the Enron case, ten outside directors
paid $13 million for securities litigation and $1.5 million for ERISA claims).
471. See Roth, Outside Director Liability, supra note 35, at 371.
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for non-executives.472 For minor errors in judgment, the range used by
Germany, a quarter up to one year’s earning, might be appropriate. For
the transatlantic discussion concerning a suitable deductible, the amount
of the Japanese cap should also be taken into account.
C. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE ISSUES (ESG),
ESPECIALLY GREEN INVESTMENT
CalPERS has plans to integrate environmental, social and
governance issues (ESG) into their investment process; it published its
first report in the spring of 2012.473 Generally, the long-term investment
projections of private pension institutions suggest their support of
sustainable investment policies. Against this backdrop, it makes sense
that insurance companies and pension funds have a strong interest in
sustainable investments474 and that appropriate indices are being
developed. It should be noted that the United Nations examined the
duties of asset managers with respect to their investments in
comparative perspective.475 As part of a campaign by the insurance
industry in the United Kingdom, ‘Climate Wise’ already represented
60% of property insurers and 50% of life insurers in 2008;476 in 2009
more than half of these incorporated a climate change analysis in their
investment strategies.477 Climate Wise is supplemented by the Carbon
Disclosure Project,478 an initiative strongly supported by British
Telecom (the majority owner of Hermes pension fund); by the terms of
the project, companies should set a goal of how much they plan to
reduce their CO2 emissions.479 Before the climate conference in
Copenhagen, institutional investors (who in total manage $13 trillion
worth of assets) signed a declaration stating which industrial nations
472. Brian R. Cheffins & Bernard S. Black, Outside Director Liability Across
Countries, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1385, 1460 (2006).
473. CALPERS, TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT: TAKING RESPONSIBILITY
(2012), available at http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/press/news/investcorp/esg-report-2012.pdf.
474. See supra Part IV.A.
475. U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME (UNEP), ASSET MGMT. WORKING GRP., FIDUCIARY
RESPONSIBILITY: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF INTEGRATING ENVIRONMENTAL,
SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE ISSUES INTO INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT (2009).
476. CLIMATEWISE, ONE YEAR REVIEW 5 (2008) (U.K.).
477. CLIMATEWISE, SECOND YEAR REVIEW 31 (2009) (U.K.).
478. See also Puri, supra note 70, at 435.
479. CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, THE CARBON CHASM 20 app. (2009) (providing
an overview of company-specific commitments).
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should reduce CO2 emissions by 80–95% by the year 2050.480 CalPERS
focuses on the disclosure of climate risks481 and, as mentioned above, is
in the midst of including climate change into its investment principles;
its spring 2012 publication included its first portfolio-wide report on
ESG.482
Even the SEC has begun to take the consequences of climate
change seriously,483 giving in to great pressure from large institutional
investors and the US insurance supervisory authority. At the beginning
of 2009, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(“NAIC”) decided to demand that insurance companies with a premium
volume of more than $500 million report the environmental risks that
could affect them.484 The questions to be answered by the insurance
companies relate mainly to the impact of climate change on their
investment portfolios.485 The NAIC has incorporated risk-focused
examination questions into the Financial Condition Examiners
Handbook, which addresses the impact of climate change.486 In Europe,
the European Commission launched a proposal to include a statement on

480. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS GRP. ON CLIMATE CHANGE ET AL., 2009 INVESTOR
STATEMENT ON THE URGENT NEED FOR A GLOBAL AGREEMENT ON CLIMATE CHANGE
(2009).
481. CALPERS, GLOBAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 223, at 63 app. G, 65 app. H.
482. CALPERS, FACTS AT A GLANCE: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 8 (2012).
483. Evan Lehmann, SEC Turnaround Sparks Sudden Look at Climate Disclosure,
N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2009/07/13/
13climatewire-sec-turnaround-sparks-sudden-look-at-climate65102.html?pagewanted=all.
484. Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs (NAIC), Insurance Regulators
Adopt Climate Change Risk Disclosure, (Mar. 17, 2009), available at
http://www.naic.org/Releases/2009_docs/climate_change_risk_disclosure_adopted.htm.
485. NAIC, INSURER CLIMATE RISK DISCLOSURE SURVEY (Mar. 28, 2010),
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_explen_climate_survey_032810.pdf
(“Question 5: Has the company considered the impact of climate change on its
investment portfolio? Has it altered its investment strategy in response to these
considerations? If so, please summarize steps you have taken.”).
486. See Climate Change and Risk Disclosure, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS (Jan,
1, 13), http://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_climate_risk_disclosure.htm.
For current activities and controversies, see ANNE OBERSTEADT, NAIC & CTR. FOR INS.
POLICY AND RESEARCH, CLIMATE RISK DISCLOSURE ACTIVITIES (2012), available at
http://www.naic.org/documents/cipr_1204_climate_risk_disclosure_activities.pdf.
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environmental, social and employee matters in the annual report of
larger firms.487
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
Labor and pensions in the United States and Germany have
significant differences. While German labor and pension law is based
on bans of unfair dismissals in labor contracts, employee representation
on supervisory boards, and public pensions, the United States provides
no such employee rights, yet occupational pension assets equal the US
GDP or the pension assets of the other OECD member states. Among
the institutional investors who together own half of all equity of USlisted firms, pension funds, particularly state pension funds, are most
active in setting corporate governance standards and imposing those
standards directly and via proxy advisors. Some of the core principles
already implemented involve independent directors, the balancing of
director primacy with shareholder rights, long-termism (meaning the
creation of long-term shareholder value), and consideration of ESG
(especially green investments).
A transatlantic view is constructive for the evaluation of these core
corporate governance principles, which are central for pension
capitalism. The European Union and the United States apply different
standards with respect to significant or majority shareholders. While the
EU recommendation—as proposed by the Corporate Governance
Commission, and perhaps in the near future by the German Corporate
Governance Code as well—provides that significant shareholders are
excluded from qualifying as independent directors, such relationships
are not mentioned in the United States. This may be relevant since
many US technology firms have founder-directors that are significant
shareholders.
The inclusion of US corporate law principles in the German Stock
Corporation Act of 1937 needs to be mentioned with respect to the
balancing of shareholder rights with director primacy. Germany has
maintained and tightened central shareholder rights, such as the right to
nominate supervisory directors; it also introduced new ones, such as the
annual discharge of supervisory and managing directors. Moreover,
487. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council
amdending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC as regards of nonfinancial and diversity information by certain large companies and groups, art. 1(1)(a),
COM (2013) 207 final, (Apr. 16, 2013).
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director compensation was mandatorily restricted to adequacy, and
director liability was sharpened (it played no de facto role until the
1990s when US standards were discussed again). Such principles are
also relevant for long-termism, and should be sharpened and raised to
the top of the institutional investors’ agenda. Pioneering pension funds,
such as CalPERS and the UK Hermes Pension Fund, as well as pension
fund associations, such as the US CII and the Australian ACSI, should
focus on long-term shareholder value and other social issues.

